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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving
medical treatment system using nondeterministic finite automata
(NFA), hereafter referred to as P-Med, designed for the remote
medical environment. P-Med makes use of the nondeterministic
transition characteristic of NFA to flexibly represent the medical
model, which includes illness states, treatment methods and
state transitions caused by exerting different treatment methods.
A medical model is encrypted and outsourced to the cloud
to deliver telemedicine services. Using P-Med, patient-centric
diagnosis and treatment can be made on-the-fly while protecting
the confidentiality of a patient’s illness states and treatment
recommendation results. Moreover, a new privacy-preserving
NFA evaluation method is given in P-Med to get a confidential
match result for the evaluation of an encrypted NFA and an
encrypted data set, which avoids the cumbersome inner state
transition determination. We demonstrate that P-Med realizes
treatment procedure recommendation without privacy leakage
to unauthorized parties. We conduct extensive experiments and
analyses to evaluate efficiency.
Index Terms—Data security and privacy, medical treatment,
nondeterministic finite automata, secure outsourced computing
I. INTRODUCTION
THE aging of population and prevalence of chronic ill-nesses have exacerbated many social problems. Remote
diagnosis and treatment systems, which make use of informa-
tion technology to provide accessible, cost-effective, and high-
quality clinical healthcare services remotely, can be deployed
to alleviate some of the problems. Such a system makes
it possible for continued treatment in a home environment
and increases patient adherence to medical recommendations
[1]. The medical Internet of Things (mIoT) plays a critical
role in distant medical diagnosis and treatment by deploying
wireless wearable (or implantable) sensors on a patient to
collect the vital signs and physiological data [2]–[4]. The
monitored physiological parameters are sent to hospital for
medical diagnosis, which supplies rich longitudinal health
records than the brief illness description. Using the detailed
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monitoring data, physicians can make a much better prognosis
for the patient and recommend treatment, early intervention
and drug adjustment that are effective for disease recovery.
The key factor for the accuracy of remote medical diagnosis
and treatment is the physician’s expertise and professional
experience. A medical model is designed in accordance with
objective and measurable observation to provide clinically
useful information about the course of the illness over time
and direct specific treatments for the condition, which plays
a significant role in regulating the treatment process and
providing premium rate healthcare services.
Finite automata (FA) [5] is one of the mainstream technolo-
gies that can be used to represent medical models. Compared
with the flow diagram or block diagram based model, a
FA-based medical model has the advantage of regularized
representation, flexibility in illness state evaluation and good
expansibility [6], [7]. FA can be categorized into two types:
deterministic finite automata (DFA) and nondeterministic finite
automata (NFA). The term “deterministic” in DFA means that
it can only transit to one state at a time (i.e. for some given
input); “nondeterministic” in NFA means it can transit to
multiple states at once. Hence, DFA can be regarded as a
special case of NFA; NFA is powerful to represent the nonde-
terministic state transitions and allows empty string input (-
move), which is more practical. NFA is a competent modeling
tool and applicable to various fields in practice, such as regular
language processing, program lexer, and medical modeling.
NFA-based medical models have been used in healthcare
monitoring [6]–[8], diagnosis and treatment of diseases [9],
virus genome detection [10], etc.
Due to the high availability, accessibility and powerful
computation capability of cloud, NFA-based medical models
can be outsourced to a cloud platform to make diagnosis
decisions and recommend the treatment methods on-the-fly
according to patient’s physiological data that are monitored
by mIoT. Such as an approach could tremendously improve
patients’ healthcare, reduce cost, and enhance the accuracy of
diagnosis due to its nature of quantitative analysis. Despite
the trememdous benefits that can be brought by the remote
diagnosis and treatment technology, healthcare providers and
patients are hesitant to adopt it without adequate security
and privacy protections [11]. Since a high quality NFA-based
medical model is often regarded as the intellectual property
and core competitiveness of a medical institution, one of
the main challenges is to protect the privacy of the model
and strictly prohibit it from disclosure during online medical
services. On the other hand, it is required in many jurisdictions
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2to protect the confidentiality of patients’ health states and
prevent them from unauthorized access. Moreover, treatment
methods for patients are highly sensitive and must be kept
confidential by the cloud platform or any other third party.
In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving medical
treatment system using NFA-based medical model, hereafter
referred to as P-Med. In a medical model, the illness states are
expressed as the NFA states; an illness state transition caused
by a therapeutic intervention is expressed as an NFA state
transition; the diversity of therapeutic responses is expressed
by exploring the nondeterministic characteristic of NFA. To
protect the privacy of the medical model, the NFA-based
model is encrypted and before it is outsourced to a cloud
server for remote medical service. In order to perform privacy-
preserving diagnosis and treatment, a patient uploads his or her
recent (e. g. several days of) illness states in encrypted form to
the cloud server which performs computations over encrypted
data. Specifically, the proposed system achieves the following.
• Privacy-preserving NFA evaluation. Privacy-preserving
NFA evaluation is essential to realize outsourced regular ex-
pression matching and pattern matching while without privacy
leakage to the cloud server which performs the computation:
given an encrypted NFA model and an encrypted set of
symbols, the encrypted matching result is obtained through
secure computation over encrypted data. Since NFA may
contain many states, transitions, loops and self-loops, the
challenge is to determine the inner state transitions caused
by the input symbols in a privacy-preserving way. Previous
schemes [10], [28], [43], [45] inevitably involve the interaction
between a server (DFA/NFA holder) and a client (string
holder) to determine the inner state transition. To overcome
this disadvantage, we propose, for the first time, a secure NFA
evaluation method to eliminate the client-server interaction
such that the inner state transition can be computed by the
server alone in a privacy-preserving way. P-Med converts the
state transition problem into string matching. It firstly traverses
the NFA model to find the regular language. Then, an elegant
protocol is designed for privacy-preserving string matching
and weight calculation (for weighted NFA). Lastly, a delicate
ranking protocol is proposed to get the best-matching patterns.
In addition, to deal with the approximate search, we design a
privacy-preserving error-tolerant NFA evaluation method (in
Section. VIII) and show its application in gene searching,
which avoids the client-server paradigm of interaction and
number of tolerated errors can be pre-defined. We believe
that the proposed secure NFA evaluation methods are not only
applicable to healthcare, but also provide a useful tool to other
DFA/NFA based applications.
• Secure automatic medical diagnosis on-the-fly. P-Med
leverages privacy-preserving protocols to calculate on patient’s
encrypted illness states and healthcare provider’s encrypted
NFA-based medical model. Illness state match protocol helps
to find the match state in the NFA-based medical model ac-
cording to patient’s multi-dimension quantitative physiological
data monitored by mIoT. Based on patient’s successive illness
states, the condition of disease is diagnosed in the cloud
through secure outsourced computation.
• Secure treatment procedure recommendation. In an
NFA-based medical model, we assign a weight to each state
transition according to the therapeutic effect of the corre-
sponding treatment method, which is also encrypted before
outsourcing. Based on the diagnosis result, P-Med traverses
all the possible treatment procedures and calculates a weighted
recommendation for each of them. Our secure best treatment
procedure selection protocol chooses the top-k recommended
procedures, which preserves data privacy throughout the se-
lection process.
• Transparent operation for patient. P-Med does not
require a patient to perform any complex pre-processing before
requesting remote medical service. The interaction between a
patient and a cloud server is simply a single round - the patient
only needs to submit his or her illness states in encrypted form
and wait to get the best treatment procedure recommendation
also in encrypted form.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section outlines the definition of FA, NFA and
weighted NFA. Also, we introduce basic cryptosystem and
privacy-preserving protocols used as building blocks of P-
Med. Table I lists the important notations in this paper.
TABLE I: Notations
Notation Description
L(X)/[[X]]pk bit length of X/ciphertext of X (encrypted by pk)
M/[[M]]pk plaintext/encrypted weighted NFA-based medical model
q/φ illness state in M/illness state of a patient
q0/F initial state/accept state set in M
y/Y treatment method/treatment method set
w/W transition weight in M/weight of treatment procedure
T P/TP treatment procedure/treatment procedure set
WT P/ET P weighted/expanded treatment procedure
WTP/ETP weighted/expanded treatment procedure set
arrayi,j the element in the ith row and jth column in array
A. Finite Automata (FA)
In computation theory [5], DFA and NFA are two most
important finite automata (Fig. 1). In DFA, the next state is
deterministic when a source state and an input symbol are
given; inputting a symbol is necessary for each state transition.
In NFA, the next state is nondeterministic given a source state
and input symbol, and several choices may exist for the next
state at any point. NFA also allows an empty string  as a
possible input, and the transitions without consuming an input
symbol are called -transitions. Formally, an NFA M0 [5] is
a 5-tuple (Q,Σ, q0,F , δ): Q = (q0, · · · , qn1) is a finite set of
states; Σ = (yσ1 , · · · , yσn2 ) is a finite set of symbols; q0 ∈ Q
is the initial state; F = (q%1 , · · · , q%n3 ) ⊆ Q is a set of accept
states; δ is the transition function, δ : Q×Σ → P(Q), P(Q)
is the power set1 of Q, Σ = Σ ∪ {}.
Let Y = (y1, · · · , yl) be a set of symbols and Y ⊆
Σ. The NFA M0 accepts Y if there exists a sequence of
states (r0, r1, · · · , rn0) in Q and satisfies: 1) r0 = q0, 2)
δ(ri, yi+1) = ri+1 for i = 0 to n0 − 1, 3) rn0 ∈ F . It is
1P(Q) is a collection of all subsets of Q, and called the power set.
3denoted as ACCEPT (M0,Y) if the automata M0 accepts Y .
Otherwise, it is denoted as REJECT (M0,Y). An NFA M0
recognizes a language L if M0 accepts all Y ∈ L and rejects
all Y /∈ L, which is called regular language. An example of
a DFA and an example of NFA are shown in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1: Examples of Finite Automata
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Fig. 2: Example of Weighted NFA
Weighted NFA [12] enables the transitions to carry weights,
which models the cost involved when executing a transi-
tion (such as the amount of resources or time needed),
or the probability or reliability of its successful execu-
tion. A weighted NFA M (over semiring2 S) is defined as
(Q,Σ, q0,F , δ, µ, γ1, γ2): Q,Σ, q0,F , δ are defined the same
as NFA; µ : Σ → SQ×Q is the transition weight function;
γ1, γ2 : Q → S are weight functions for entering and leaving
a state, respectively. Here, µ(y) is a (|Q|× |Q|)-matrix whose
(qi, qj)-entry µ(y)qi,qj ∈ S indicates the weight w of transi-
tion qi
y−→ qj , and the weighted transition can be represented
as qi
y,w−→ qj . For simplicity, we set γ1(q0) = 1, γ2(q%i) = 1
(∀q%i ∈ F) to omit the functions γ1, γ2 in this paper, and
briefly denote the weighted NFA as M = (Q,Σ, q0,F , δ, µ).
Figure 2 shows an example of weighted NFA, where the
transition weights are labeled in blue.
B. Threshold Paillier Cryptosystem
P-Med utilizes Paillier cryptosystem with threshold decryp-
tion (PCTD) [13], [14] as the basic crypto primitive. PCTD
includes the following algorithms: KeyGen, encryption (Enc),
decryption with weak secret key (WDec), decryption with
master secret key (SDec), master secret key splitting (SKeyS),
partial decryption Step-1 (PD1), partial decryption Step-2
(PD2) and ciphertext refresh (CR) (the concrete algorithms
are shown in supplemental materials A-1). The ciphertext of
2Semiring S is an algebraic structure (S,+, ·, 0, 1) satisfying the usual
axioms for a (not necessarily commutative) ring, but without the requirement
that addition be invertible. Important examples of semiring include: the
natural numbers (ZN ,+, ·, 0, 1) with the usual addition and multiplication;
the Boolean semiring B = ({0, 1},∨,∧, 0, 1) [12].
X ∈ ZN (encrypted by pk) is denoted as [[X]]pk. PCTD is
additive homomorphic ([[m1]]pk · [[m2]]pk = [[m1 + m2]]pk)
and scalar-multiplicative homomorphic (([[m]]pk)r = [[r ·m]]pk,
∀r ∈ ZN ).
C. Privacy-preserving Protocols
P-Med makes use of the following protocols as the primitive
privacy-preserving tools, which are introduced in our previous
work [15]–[17] and supplemental material A. Let pkA and pkB
be the public keys of users A and B. pkσ is an authorization
public key from user A to B, and the authorization secret
key skσ is utilized to decrypt the corresponding ciphertext
(refer to section V-A for the details). Given a keyword X (in
arbitrary language with arbitrary symbols), secure keyword to
ciphertext algorithm (K2C) [15] encodes it to a unique element
in ZN and outputs its ciphertext [[X]]pk. Given [[X]]pkA and
[[Y ]]pkB , secure addition protocol (SAD) outputs [[X + Y ]]pkσ ,
and secure multiplication protocol (SMD) outputs [[X · Y ]]pkσ .
Secure greater or equal protocol (SGE) outputs [[u∗]]pkσ ←
SGE([[X]]pkA , [[Y ]]pkB ) such that u
∗ = 1 if X ≥ Y and
u∗ = 0 if X < Y . Secure less or equal protocol (SLE)
outputs [[u∗]]pkσ ← SLE([[X]]pkA , [[Y ]]pkB ) such that u∗ = 1
if X ≤ Y and u∗ = 0 if X > Y . Secure less than protocol
(SLT) outputs [[u∗]]pkσ ← SLT([[X]]pkA , [[Y ]]pkB ) such that
u∗ = 1 if X < Y and u∗ = 0 if X ≥ Y . Secure greater than
protocol (SGT) outputs [[u∗]]pkσ ← SGT([[X]]pkA , [[Y ]]pkB )
such that u∗ = 1 if X > Y and u∗ = 0 if X ≤ Y .
Secure equivalent test protocol (SET) outputs [[u∗]]pkσ such
that u∗ = 1 if X = Y and u∗ = 0 if X 6= Y . Secure
unequal test protocol (SUT) outputs [[u∗]]pkσ such that u
∗ = 0
if X = Y and u∗ = 1 if X 6= Y . Given [[X]]pkA , [[Y1]]pkB
and [[Y2]]pkB , secure range comparison protocol (SRC) outputs
[[u∗]]pkσ ← SRC([[X]]pkA , [[Y1]]pkB , [[Y2]]pkB ) such that u∗ = 1
if Y1 ≤ X ≤ Y2 and u∗ = 0 otherwise.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
P-Med consists of five entities (Fig. 3): key generation cen-
ter (KGC), cloud platform (CP), computing service provider
(CSP), hospitals and patients.
• KGC is a trusted party, and tasked to distribute the
public/secret keys and grant authorizations ( 1©).
• Hospital designs medical models for distinct diseases.
Without loss of generality, we consider just one medical model
per hospital in our description. After encryption, a hospital
outsources its own encrypted medical model to CP ( 2©).
• Patient is monitored by mIoT. If patient needs diagnostic
and treatment service, the encrypted illness states are sent to
CP ( 3©) to issue a query. After the result is returned, patient
recovers it using the secret key ( 5©).
• CP has powerful storage and computation capability,
tasked to provide storage service for hospitals and respond
on the medical query from the patients. CSP provides online
calculation service. Upon receiving a patient’s query, CP and
CSP interactively execute the outsource computing protocols
to find the best encrypted treatment procedures ( 4©).
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Fig. 3: System Model
B. Attack Model and Security Model
In the attack model [18], [19], CP/CSP/hospital/patient are
“honest-but-curious” entities that are honest to execute the
protocols but curious with other entity’s data. An adversary
A∗ is defined: 1) A∗ could eavesdrop all communications. 2)
A∗ could get all ciphertext stored in CP, and data sent by
CSP. 3) A∗ could compromise CSP to get the data sent by
CP. 4) A∗ could compromise patients (except the challenge
patient) aiming at getting the challenge patient’s plaintext. But
A∗ could not compromise CP and CSP at the same time, nor
challenge patient.
We adopt the security model in [20], [21]. Consider
four parties: patient/hospital (a.k.a ”D1”), CP (a.k.a ”S1”)
and CSP (a.k.a ”S2”). We construct three simulators
(SimD1 , SimS1 , SimS2) against three types of attackers
(AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2) that corrupt D1, S1 and S2, respectively.
These attackers are non-colluding and semi-honest. Refer to
supplemental material B for the details.
C. Design Goals
The core requirement of P-Med is that the servers cannot
deduce any useful information from the NFA-based medical
model, the patient’s illness states, and the treatment recom-
mendation result. We summarize the design goals as below.
• Medical Model and Data Confidentiality. The servers are
not able to recover any useful information from encrypted
NFA-based medical model, which includes the encrypted
illness states, the encrypted treatment methods and the en-
crypted transition weights. No useful information should
be leaked from the patient’s encrypted illness states.
• Treatment Recommendation Confidentiality. The servers
can not derive any useful information from the encrypted
treatment recommendation result, which includes the
illness state match result, the transitions caused by the
patient’s illness states, the treatment procedure weights,
and the treatment recommendations.
• Soundness. Soundness includes completeness and correct-
ness: completeness ensures that all the match treatment
procedures can be found; correctness guarantees that top-
k best procedures are recommended.
IV. DESIGN PRINCIPLE OF P-MED
This section introduces weighted NFA-based medical model
and the challenges of P-Med design. Next, the design principle
is explicitly analyzed in plaintext to improve the readability.
A. Weighted NFA-based Medical Model Representation
NFA-based medical model [6], [7], [9] is denoted as M0 =
(Q,Σ, q0,F , δ): 1) Q = (q0, · · · , qn1) represents the illness
state set; 2) Σ = (yσ1 , · · · , yσn2 ) represents the treatment
method set; 3) δ represents the changing of illness states when
a particular treatment method is implemented; 4)  represents
that no treatment is implemented; 5) nondeterministic charac-
teristic represents the individual specificity in the treatment.
Suppose several patients are in the illness state qi and treated
with the same therapeutic method yj , their state may transit
to different illness states due to diverse medical responses.
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Fig. 4: An Example of Weighted NFA-based Medical Model
Fig. 4 depicts an example of NFA-based medical model
of gestational diabetes [9], in which the 8 states describe the
illness conditions and the 5 input symbols describe the thera-
pies. The initial state is q0 (represents “gestational diabetes”)
and the accept states are (q6, q7) = (“cure”, “hospitalize”). At
the beginning, the initial state q0 transits to q1 or q2 with the
empty symbol input , which indicates that the patient with
gestational diabetes may have state q1 (represent “moderate
diabetes”) or q2 (represent “mild diabetes & moderate hyper-
tension”) without any medical intervention. If the patient is
in the state q3 and exerted with y3 = “therapy C”, the state
may transit to q3, q4 or q6, which differs due to individual
differences. The illness states are measured and represented by
the physiological indexes such as blood pressure (BP), blood
glucose (BG), which is elaborated in Section V-C.
To provide treatment recommendations to the patients, the
medical model designer sets weight w for each transition in
the NFA-based medical model M0 and the lower transition
weight indicates higher recommend level, which is measured
by the effectiveness, side effects, cost/performance ratio, etc.
The weighted NFA-based medical model is denoted as M =
(Q,Σ, q0,F , δ, µ), where µ is defined in Subsection II-A. In
Fig. 4, the transitions that lead to the accept state q6 = “cure”
have lower weights, which infers preferred treatment methods;
on the other hand, the transitions that lead to q7 = “hospitalize”
have obviously higher weights.
B. The Challenges of Treatment Recommendation
When a patient B submits the recent illness states Φ =
(φ1, · · · , φm) to the server to query treatment recommenda-
5tion, CP and CSP searches for the successive states in M that
match with Φ and the result is classified into two situations:
1) Φ does not appear in M, which indicates that the patient’s
condition is not included in the medical model. 2) Φ is found
in M and the match state set is (qθj¯ , · · · , qθj¯+m−1). For the
former, the servers do not take further computation and output
a symbol indicating that no match result is found. For the latter,
the servers continue to find the best treatment procedures: start
at the state qθj¯+m−1 to find all the paths that leads to the accept
states in F ; evaluate each path and calculate a treatment proce-
dure weight to indicate the recommendation level. Suppose the
path is qθj¯+m−1
yθj¯+m ,wθj¯+m−−−−−−−−−→ qθj¯+m → · · ·
yθτ ,wθτ−−−−−→ qθτ with
qθτ ∈ F , the path weight is calculated as W = Στk=j¯+mwθk .
Then, the servers rank these weights and recommend the top-k
treatment procedures that have the lowest weights.
The above treatment recommendation process is analyzed
in the plaintext viewpoint and the process is pretty straight-
forward. However, it is much more complicated when the
hospital’s medical model M and the patient’s query Φ are
encrypted. The challenges that are faced by the P-Med design
are elaborated below. 1) Since the states in M and Φ are
encrypted, the servers search for the match states in M in
a blind manner. According to the design goal, the illness state
match result should be kept confidential, which indicates that
the servers do not know whether the state in Φ matches with
any given state in M. 2) Since the state match results are
unknown, the servers are uncertain about whether Φ appears
in M. They cannot distinguish two situations nor take different
approaches to do the following calculations. 3) If Φ indeed
appears in M, the server can not determine which illness state
sets in M match with Φ, nor decide which state in M is the
right start point to search for the treatment procedures. 4) Since
the NFA-based medical model could be quite complicated and
contain many different paths leading to the accept states, it is
a challenge for the servers to find all the treatment procedures
for the patient to satisfy the completeness requirement in the
design goal, especially when the medical model contains loops
and self-loops. 5) According to the design goal, the weights of
the match treatment procedures are kept secret, and the servers
need to rank the weight in a privacy-preserving way.
C. Design Principles
To deal with the above challenges, P-Med should be de-
signed from the ciphertext viewpoint and follow the following
principles. 1) On the premise of the confidentiality of medical
model, medical data and treatment result, the design goal of
completeness should be realized by the traverse of all the paths
from the initial state to the accept states. 2) Since the state
match result is unknown to the server, the path weight has to
be computed for each traversed paths. A single unified path
weight calculation algorithm should be designed, which is ap-
plicable to both of the situations: Φ appears in the path (named
matched path), and Φ does not appear in the path (named
unmatched path). To realize the design goal of correctness, the
weights of the matched paths should be absolutely lower than
that of the unmatched paths. And the matched paths leading to
the accept state with good therapeutic effect should result in
lower path weights. 3) Privacy-preserving treatment procedure
selection algorithm needs to be designed to rank the encrypted
weights and select the top-k best treatment procedures. To
realize the treatment recommendation confidentiality, it is
required that the servers cannot distinguish which treatment
procedures are recommended.
For ease of understanding, we use the plaintext form of Fig.
4 to illustrate how the design principles work.
(1) According to principle 1, we design a traverse algorithm
to traverse all the paths that start from the initial state q0
and end at an accept state. To avoid endless loops, it is
necessary to set the maximum visit time MV isit that each
state can be included in a path, and the maximum state
number MState contained in a path. The i-th traversed path
is represented as q0
yi,θ1 ,wi,θ1−−−−−−−→ qi,θ1
yi,θ2 ,wi,θ2−−−−−−−→ qi,θ2 →
· · · yi,θτi ,wi,θτi−−−−−−−−→ qi,θτi with qθi,τi ∈ F , and denoted as the
i-th treatment procedure T Pi = (Qi,Yi,Wi), where the
illness state set Qi = (q0, qi,θ1 , · · · , qi,θτi ), the treatment
method set Yi = (yi,θ1 , · · · , yi,θτi ), the transition weight
set Wi = (wi,θ1 , · · · , wi,θτi ). If n paths are found in NFA-
based medical model M, the traversed treatment procedure
set is denoted as TP = (T P1, · · · , T Pn). The concrete
construction is shown in secure treatment procedure traverse
algorithm (TPT) in Section VI-B.
(2) According to principle 2, we design a unified path
weight calculation algorithm that is suitable for both of the
matched and unmatched situations. If Φ = (φ1, · · · , φm)
does not match with any successive m states in T Pi, the
treatment procedure weight is set to Wi = MWeight,
where MWeight is the maximum weight pre-defined by
a hospital for any unmatched path. MWeight should be
defined absolutely larger than all the weights of the matched
paths. If Φ = (φ1, · · · , φm) match with (qi,θj¯ , · · · , qi,θj¯+m−1)
for the first time in T Pi, the weight is the sum of the
transition weights from qi,θj¯+m−1 to the accept state qi,θτ and
calculated as Wi = Στik=j¯+mwi,θk . The transitions that lead
to better treatment accept result are set to have relatively
lower weight. Then, we have Wi = MWeight for the
unmatched paths and Wi = Στik=j¯+mwi,θk for the matched
paths. After the calculation, the weighted treatment procedure
is denoted as WT Pi = (Qi,Yi,Wi), which substitutes the
transition weight set Wi = (wi,θ1 , · · · , wi,θτi ) in T Pi with
the weight Wi in WT Pi. The set is denoted as WTP =
(WT P1, · · · ,WT Pn). The concrete construction is shown in
secure treatment procedure weight calculation algorithm (TPW)
in Section VI-C.
(3) According to principle 3, we design a best treatment
procedure selection algorithm with privacy protection mecha-
nism. To prevent the server from discovering which treatment
procedures are recommended to the patient, it is necessary to
unify the lengths of the treatment procedures in WTP. With-
out this processing, the server could get useful information
about the result according to the length of the recommended
result. Suppose the treatment procedure WT Pj with the
longest path in WTP has MState illness states, i.e., |Qj | =
MState, |Yj | = MState − 1. Then, we expand WT Pi into
expanded treatment procedure ET Pi by appending dummy
6symbols (e.g., ⊥) after the illness states and treatment methods
such that |Qi| = MState, |Yi| = MState−1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The weight values Wi are the same inWT Pi and ET Pi. The
set is denoted as ETP = (ET P1, · · · , ET Pn). It is noted that
these dummy symbols are indistinguishable from the normal
data after the encryption in the privacy-preserving algorithm.
The treatment procedure selection process consists of three
protocols to fulfill the task. Secure minimum selection pro-
tocol (SMin) selects the best treatment procedure from two
procedures: given the ciphertexts of (ET P1, ET P2), it outputs
the ciphertext of ET PMin such that WMin = min(W1,W2).
Secure minimum selection from n treatment procedures pro-
tocol (SMinn) leverages SMin as sub-protocol: given the
ciphertexts of (ET P1, · · · , ET Pn), it outputs the cipher-
text of ET PMin such that WMin = min(W1, · · · ,Wn).
Secure top-k best treatment procedure selection protocol
(BPS-k) leverages SMinn as sub-protocol: given the cipher-
texts of (ET P1, · · · , ET Pn), it outputs the ciphertexts of
(ET PMin1 , · · · , ET PMink) such that (WMin1 , · · · ,WMink)
are the top-k lowest weights. The concrete construction of
these protocols is shown in Section VI-D.
D. Example
A toy example is used to illustrate how the design principles
work in P-Med. Suppose MState = 4 and three paths are
traversed: 1) q0
y1,w1−−−→ q1; 2) q0 y2,w2−−−→ q2 y3,w3−−−→ q1; 3)
q0
y2,w2−−−→ q2 y4,w4−−−→ q3 y5,w5−−−→ q4. Then we have T P1 =
((q0, q1), (y1), (w1)), T P2 = ((q0, q2, q1), (y2, y3), (w2, w3)),
T P3 = ((q0, q2, q3, q4), (y2, y4, y5), (w2, w4, w5)). After the
weight calculation, we obtain WT P1 = ((q0, q1), (y1),W1),
WT P2 = ((q0, q2, q1), (y2, y3),W2), WT P3 = ((q0, q2, q3,
q4), (y2, y4, y5),W3). Then, expand treatment procedures into
ET P1 = ((q0, q1,⊥,⊥), (y1,⊥,⊥),W1),
ET P2 = ((q0, q2, q1,⊥), (y2, y3,⊥),W2),
ET P3 = ((q0, q2, q3, q4), (y2, y4, y5),W3).
Next, we take the weighted medical model M in Fig. 4 as an
example to illustrate the framework of P-Med. Firstly, set the
parameters MV isit = 2,MState = 8. The traverse algorithm
finds all the paths that start from q0 and end at q6 or q7. The
traversed treatment procedures are TP = (T P1, · · · , T P11):
1. q0
,w1−−−→ q1 y1,w3−−−→ q3 y3,w6−−−→ q3 y3,w7−−−→ q4 y6,w10−−−−→ q6,
2. q0
,w1−−−→ q1 y1,w3−−−→ q3 y3,w6−−−→ q3 y3,w7−−−→ q4 ,w11−−−→ q7,
3. q0
,w1−−−→ q1 y1,w3−−−→ q3 y3,w6−−−→ q3 y3,w9−−−→ q6,
4. q0
,w1−−−→ q1 y1,w3−−−→ q3 y3,w7−−−→ q4 y4,w4−−−→ q1 y1,w3−−−→ q3 y3,w7−−−→
q4
y6,w10−−−−→ q6,
5. q0
,w1−−−→ q1 y1,w3−−−→ q3 y3,w7−−−→ q4 y4,w4−−−→ q1 y1,w3−−−→ q3 y3,w7−−−→
q4
,w11−−−→ q7,
6. q0
,w1−−−→ q1 y1,w3−−−→ q3 y3,w7−−−→ q4 y4,w4−−−→ q1 y1,w3−−−→ q3 y3,w9−−−→
q6,
7. q0
,w1−−−→ q1 y1,w3−−−→ q3 y3,w7−−−→ q4 y6,w10−−−−→ q6,
8. q0
,w1−−−→ q1 y1,w3−−−→ q3 y3,w7−−−→ q4 ,w11−−−→ q7,
9. q0
,w1−−−→ q1 y1,w3−−−→ q3 y3,w9−−−→ q6,
10. q0
,w2−−−→ q2 y2,w5−−−→ q5 y5,w8−−−→ q5 y6,w12−−−−→ q7,
11. q0
,w2−−−→ q2 y2,w5−−−→ q5 y6,w12−−−−→ q7.
Then, set the parameter MWeight = 10000 for weight
calculation algorithm. Suppose patient’s illness state set Φ =
(φ1, φ2, φ3) matches with (q1, q3, q4) in M. The weight calcu-
lation algorithm try to find the match state set in each treatment
procedure. In above paths, the match state set (q1, q3, q4) that
appears for the first time are labeled with red; (q1, q3, q4) that
appears for the second time are labeled with purple. According
to design principle 2, we have W1 = W2 = W3 = W9 =
W10 = W11 = MWeight = 10000 for unmatched paths; for
matched paths, we have W4 = w4 + w3 + w7 + w10 = 10,
W5 = w4 +w3 +w7 +w11 = 109, W6 = w4 +w3 +w9 = 5,
W7 = w10 = 1, W8 = w11 = 100. Lastly, set the parameter
k = 3 for selection algorithm to get the top-3 best treatment
procedures: 7-th, 6-th and 4-th treatment procedures with the
lowest weights 1, 5, 10, respectively.
V. BASIC COMPONENT OF P-MED
This section introduces how to distribute keys, grant user
authentication, encrypt medical model and patient’s query,
represent illness state and make state match test for P-Med.
A. Key Distribution and User Authorization
KGC runs the KeyGen algorithm in PCTD to generate the
public parameter PP = (g,N) and master secret key SK = λ
for the system, and SKeyS algorithm to generate the partial
strong keys SK1 = λ1 and SK2 = λ2 for CP and CSP,
respectively. KGC generates the secret/public key pair skA =
a, pkA = g
a for hospital A, and skB = b, pkB = gb for patient
B, where a, b are randomly selected from ZN .
If a patient B wishes to request service from hospi-
tal A, A defines a valid service time period in the form
of SP = “20190101-20191231”. Then, KGC generates a
certificate number CN , and a certificate CERA,B : 〈cer =
(CN,A,B, SP, pkσ), Sig(cer, SK)〉, where pkσ = gskσ ,
skσ ∈R ZN , and skσ is confidentially sent to B.
B. Encryption of Medical Model and Query
Hospital A encrypts the weighted NFA-
based medical model to [[M]]pkA =
([[Q]]pkA , [[Σ]]pkA , [[q0]]pkA , [[F ]]pkA , [[δ]]pkA , [[µ]]pkA), where
the encrypted states [[Q]] = ([[q0]], · · · , [[qn1 ]]), the encrypted
treatment methods [[Σ]] = ([[yσ1 ]], · · · , [[yσn2 ]]), the encrypted
accept states [[F ]] = ([[q%1 ]], · · · , [[q%n3 ]]), the encrypted
transition weights [[W]] = ([[w1]], · · · , [[wn5 ]]), and the empty
symbol  is encrypted to [[]].3 For example, the weighted
NFA-based medical model shown in Fig. 4 is encrypted to the
one show in Fig. 5. The encrypted transition function [[δ]]pkA
and encrypted transition weight function [[µ]]pkA of Fig. 5
is represented by a weighted state transition table shown in
Table II, which is a two-dimensional table with one dimension
representing the current states and the other dimension the
next states. The row/column intersection contains the input
symbol that leads the current state transiting to the next state,
and the transition weight (in blue characters).
When patient B queries the telemedical service, the illness
states Φ = (φ1, · · · , φm) in the last few days are encrypted
into [[Φ]]pkB = ([[φ1]]pkB , · · · , [[φm]]pkB ) and sent to CP, which
is used for diagnosis and treatment recommendation.
3The encryption key pkA is omitted here to simplify the expression.
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Fig. 5: Encryption of Weighted NFA
TABLE II: Weighted State Transition Table
Input
Next State
[[q1]] [[q2]] [[q3]] [[q4]] [[q5]] [[q6]] [[q7]]
C
ur
re
nt
St
at
e [[q0]] [[]], [[w1]] [[]], [[w2]] ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
[[q1]] ⊥ ⊥ [[y1]], [[w3]] ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
[[q2]] ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ [[y2]], [[w5]] ⊥ ⊥
[[q3]] ⊥ ⊥ [[y3]], [[w6]][[y3]], [[w7]] ⊥ [[y3]], [[w9]] ⊥
[[q4]] [[y4]],[[w4]] ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ [[y6]], [[w10]] [[]], [[w11]]
[[q5]] ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ [[y5]], [[w8]] ⊥ [[y6]] ,[[w12]]
C. Illness State Representation and Match Test
Illness State Representation. In the healthcare domain, the
illness state can be expressed by symptoms and a set of
physiological index, where the former can be described by
the patient and the latter can be monitored by the mIoT. P-
Med adopts this method, and Fig. 6 shows an example for
the representation of q, φ and the encryption of them. Five
vital signs of human body are body temperature (BT), blood
pressure (BP), blood glucose level (BG), respiratory rate (RR)
and heart rate (HR), which have frequently-used units ◦C,
mmHg, mmol/L, breaths per minute and beats per minute,
respectively. In Fig. 6, the illness state q in medical model
utilizes intervals to describe the five vital signs and several
medical terminologies (in lexicographical order) to describe
the symptoms. The illness state φ of patient B is represented
by the concrete physiological index rather than interval. If the
value of the physiological index is a decimal, an integer (10 or
100) should be multiplied to the value such that the decimal
is mapped to ZN . The multiplication operation should be
uniform between the hospital A and patient B. The symptoms
and the treatment methods are encrypted utilizing K2C.
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Fig. 6: State Encryption Example
State Match Test. Secure illness state match protocol (SSM)
takes [[q]]pkA , [[φ]]pkB as input, and outputs [[u
∗]]pkσ , where
u∗ = 1 indicates that q and φ match; otherwise, u∗ = 0.
Since it is impossible to exhaustively enumerate all the illness
states of various diseases, we utilize the example in Fig. 6 to
illustrate how to design SSM shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: SECURE ILLNESS STATE MATCH PROTO-
COL (SSM)
Input: [[q]]pkA , [[φ]]pkB .
Output: [[u∗]]pkσ .
1 initializes [[u∗]]pkσ = [[1]]pkσ ;
2 CP and CSP jointly calculate
[[u1]]pkσ ← SRC([[BTB ]]pkB , [[BTA,1]]pkA , [[BTA,2]]pkA);
3 [[u2,1]]pkσ ← SRC([[BPB,1]]pkB , [[BPA,1]]pkA , [[BPA,3]]pkA);
4 [[u2,2]]pkσ ← SRC([[BPB,2]]pkB , [[BPA,2]]pkA , [[BPA,4]]pkA);
5 [[u2]]pkσ ← SMD([[u2,1]]pkσ , [[u2,2]]pkσ );
6 [[u3]]pkσ ← SRC([[BGB ]]pkB , [[BGA,1]]pkA , [[BGA,2]]pkA);
7 [[u4]]pkσ ← SGT([[RRB ]]pkB , [[RRA]]pkA);
8 [[u5]]pkσ ← SLT([[HRB ]]pkB , [[HRA]]pkA);
9 [[u6,1]]pkσ ← SET([[SB,1]]pkB , [[SA,1]]pkA);
10 [[u6,2]]pkσ ← SET([[SB,2]]pkB , [[SA,2]]pkA);
11 [[u6]]pkσ ← SMD([[u6,1]]pkσ , [[u6,2]]pkσ );
12 for i = 1 to 6 do
13 [[u∗]]pkσ ← SMD([[u∗]]pkσ , [[ui]]pkσ );
14 Return [[u∗]]pkσ .
In Algorithm 1, line 2 tests whether the patient B’s body
temperature BTB is in the range [BTA,1, BTA,2], and we
have u1 = 1 if it holds (otherwise, u1 = 0). Line 3-5 tests
whether B’s blood pressure BPB,1/BPB,2 is in the range
[BPA,1/BPA,2, BPA,3/BPA,4], and we have u2 = 1 if it
holds (otherwise, u2 = 0). Line 6 tests whether B’s blood
glucose level BGB is in the range [BGA,1, BGA,2], and we
have u3 = 1 if it holds (otherwise, u3 = 0). Line 7 tests
whether B’s respiratory rate RRB > RRA, and we have
u4 = 1 if it holds (otherwise, u4 = 0). Line 8 tests whether
B’s heart rate HRB < HRA, and we have u5 = 1 if
it holds (otherwise, u5 = 0). Line 9-11 tests whether B’s
symptoms (SB,1, SB,2) match with (SA,1, SA,2) in q, and we
have u6 = 1 if it holds (otherwise, u6 = 0). Line 12-13
tests whether B’s illness state φ matches with q, and we
have u∗ = 1 if it holds (otherwise, u∗ = 0). Algorithm 1
is elaborated in supplemental material C-1.
VI. PROPOSED P-MED FRAMEWORK
This section introduces the system overview and constructs
the concrete privacy-preserving algorithms (protocols) accord-
ing to the design principles proposed in Section IV-C.
A. System Overview
P-Med consists of the following four phases (Fig. 7).
Treatment Procedure Traverse. According to design princi-
ple 1, CP traverses all the treatment procedures in the medical
model [[M]]pkA and obtains the encrypted treatment proce-
dure set [[TP]]pkA with elements ([[T P1]]pkA , · · · , [[T Pn]]pkA),
where [[T Pi]]pkA = ([[Qi]]pkA , [[Yi]]pkA , [[Wi]]pkA) contains
the encrypted sets of illness states, treatment methods and
transition weights, respectively.
Treatment Procedure Weight Calculation. According to de-
sign principle 2, CP and CSP calculates on [[Φ]]pkB and
[[T Pi]]pkA to get the treatment procedure weight [[Wi]]pkσ and
obtain the weighted treatment procedures set [[WTP]]pkA =
8([[WT P1]]pkA , · · · , [[WT Pn]]pkA), where [[WT Pi]]pkA =
([[Qi]]pkA , [[Yi]]pkA , [[Wi]]pkσ ).
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Fig. 7: P-Med Framework
Treatment Procedure Expansion. Since the elements in
[[WTP]]pkA may contain different numbers of encrypted illness
states and treatment methods, CP and CSP may utilize the
length to distinguish the results of P-Med. According to
design principle 3, it is necessary to uniform the length
by appending encrypted dummy symbols to get expended
weighted treatment procedure set [[ETP]]pkA .
Best Treatment Procedure Selection. According to design
principle 3, secure top-k best treatment procedure selection
protocol (BPS-k) calculates the top-k most recommended
treatment procedures (with the top-k lowest weights). BPS-k
makes use of the secure minimum selection subprotocols
SMin/SMinn to select the treatment procedure with the lowest
weight from two/n treatment procedures, and SMin is a
subprotocol of SMinn.
B. Secure Treatment Procedure Traverse
According to design principle 1, secure treatment procedure
traverse algorithm (TPT) finds all the treatment procedures in
[[M]]pkA , which comes from [[q0]]pkA to [[F ]]pkA . In compu-
tation theory’s view, TPT finds the regular language of the
NFA [[M]]pkA . In graph theory’s view, TPT finds all the paths
from [[q0]]pkA to [[F ]]pkA in the graph of [[M]]pkA , which may
contain loops and self-loops. To prevent endless loops, hospital
A needs to designate the maximum visit time MV isit that
each state can be included in a treatment procedure, and the
maximum state number MState that each treatment procedure
contains.
Given [[M]]pkA ,MV isit,MState as input, TPT (Algo-
rithm 2) outputs [[TP]]pkA = ([[T P1]]pkA , · · · , [[T Pn]]pkA),
where [[T Pi]]pkA = ([[Qi]]pkA , [[Yi]]pkA , [[Wi]]pkA), illness
states [[Qi]]pkA = ([[q0]]pkA , [[qi,θ1 ]]pkA , · · · , [[qi,θτi ]]pkA), treat-
ment methods [[Yi]]pkA = ([[yi,θ1 ]]pkA , · · · , [[yi,θτi ]]pkA) 4, and
transition weights [[Wi]]pkA = ([[wi,θ1 ]]pkA , · · · , [[wi,θτi ]]pkA).
The elements in [[Qi]]pkA , [[Yi]]pkA and [[Wi]]pkA are arranged
in accordance to the path in the directed graph of [[M]]pkA .
For a particular [[M]]pkA , CP runs TPT only once and stores
[[TP]]pkA in the cloud. The basic idea of TPT is summarized
as the following steps.
4To facilitate the expression, the encrypted empty string [[]] is also denoted
as a symbol in ([[yi,θ1 ]]pkA , · · · , [[yi,θτi ]]pkA ).
Algorithm 2: SECURE TREATMENT PROCEDURE TRA-
VERSE ALGORITHM (TPT)
Input: [[M]]pkA , MV isit, MState.
Output: [[TP]]pkA = ([[T P1]]pkA , · · · , [[T Pn]]pkA).
1 set the arrays value(·, ·), weight(·, ·) according to the state
transition table of the encrypted NFA [[M]]pkA ;
2 set the stacks Q,Y,W to be empty and set n = 0;
3 for i = 0 to n1 do
4 set counti = 0;
5 for k = 0 to MV isit do
6 for i = 0 to n1 do
7 for j = 0 to n1 do
8 set visitk,i,j = 0;
9 Q.push ([[q0]]pkA ), count0 = count0 + 1;
10 while Q 6= ∅ do
11 set α = Q.peak.element, β = −1;
12 for i = 1 to n1 do
13 if (valueα,i 6= ⊥) & (visitcount[α],α,i = 0) then
14 set β = i, visitcount[α],α,β = 1;
15 if β = −1 then
16 for j = 0 to n1 do
17 set visitcount[α],α,j = 0;
18 Q.pop;
19 countα = countα − 1;
20 if Y 6= ∅ then
21 Y .pop, W .pop;
22 else if (β 6= −1) & (countβ < MV isit) then
23 Y .push (valueα,β), W .push (weightα,β), Q.push
([[qβ ]]pkA ), countβ = countβ + 1;
24 if Q 6= ∅ then
25 set α′ = Q.peak.element;
26 if ([[qα′ ]]pkA ∈ [[F ]]pkA) then
27 n = n+ 1, [[Qn]]pkA = Q, [[Yn]]pkA = Y ,
[[Wn]]pkA = W ;
28 Q.pop, Y .pop, W .pop, countα′ = countα′ − 1;
29 else if ([[qα′ ]]pkA /∈ [[F ]]pkA) & (Q.size = MState)
then
30 Q.pop, Y .pop, W .pop, countα′ = countα′ − 1;
31 set [[T Pi]]pkA = ([[Qi]]pkA , [[Yi]]pkA , [[Wi]]pkA) (1 ≤ i ≤ n);
32 Return [[TP]]pkA = ([[T P1]]pkA , · · · , [[T Pn]]pkA).
1) Push [[q0]]pkA into stack Q.
2) Set the encrypted illness state on the top of the stack Q
as α. Check whether there exists any illness state satisfies the
following requirements: it is connected with the illness state
α and has not been visited starting from the encrypted illness
state α.
3) If such illness state in step 2 exists in the graph, push it
into Q; otherwise, pop α from Q.
4) If the top element in Q does not belong to [[F ]]pkA
and Q achieves the maximum illness state number MState,
pop it from Q; otherwise, TPT algorithm successfully
finds out a treatment procedure from [[q0]]pkA to [[F ]]pkA
The found treatment procedure is recorded in T Pi =
{[[Qi]]pkA , [[Yi]]pkA , [[Wi]]pkA} (i ∈ [1, n]), and then pop the
top element in Q.
5) Repeat the steps 2-4 until the stack Q is empty.
The notations in the TPT are introduced below.
9• count(·). The one-dimensional array count(·) has n1+1
elements, and the element counti counts the number of
encrypted illness state [[qi]]pkA in Q, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n1.
• value(·, ·), weight(·, ·). The two-dimensional arrays
value(·, ·), weight(·, ·) have n1 +1 rows and n1 +1 columns,
and are initialized according to the state transition table of
[[M]]pkA . The label of the first (resp. second) dimension rep-
resents the label of the current (resp. next) state. The element
in value(·, ·) (resp. weight(·, ·)) represents the encrypted
treatment method (resp. encrypted transition weight) from the
current state to the next one.
• visit(·, ·, ·). The three-dimensional array visit(·, ·, ·) is
an array of matrices and it has (MV isit+ 1) matrices, where
each matrices has n1 + 1 rows and n1 + 1 columns. Since
each state [[qi]]pkA may appear at most MV isit times in a
treatment procedure, and counti counts its occurrence number
in Q. For [[qi]]pkA that appears the counti-th time in Q, the
element visitcount[i],i,j = 1 indicates that transition from
[[qi]]pkA to [[qj ]]pkA is visited, and visitcount[i],i,j = 0 indicates
that transition is not visited.
TPT is elaborated in supplemental material C-2.
C. Secure Treatment Procedure Weight Calculation
Algorithm 3: SECURE TREATMENT PROCEDURE
WEIGHT CALCULATION PROTOCOL (TPW)
Input: MWeight, [[Φ]]pkB = ([[φ1]]pkB , · · · , [[φm]]pkB ),
[[TP]]pkA = ([[T P1]]pkA , · · · , [[T Pn]]pkA).
Output: [[WTP]]pkA = ([[WT P1]]pkA , · · · , [[WT Pn]]pkA).
1 for i = 1 to n do
2 [[Wi]]pkσ = [[0]]pkσ , [[vi]]pkσ = [[1]]pkσ , [[v
′
i]]pkσ = [[0]]pkσ ;
3 if θτi − 1 ≥ m then
4 for j = 0 to θτi −m− 1 do
5 [[sj ]]pkσ = [[0]]pkσ , [[s
′
j ]]pkσ = [[0]]pkσ ,
[[s′′j ]]pkσ = [[0]]pkσ ;
6 [[aj ]]pkσ = [[0]]pkσ , [[a
′
j ]]pkσ = [[0]]pkσ ,
[[a′′j ]]pkσ = [[1]]pkσ ;
7 for k = 1 to m do
8 [[uk]]pkσ ← SSM([[φk]]pkB , [[qi,θj+(k−1) ]]pkA);
9 [[aj ]]pkσ = [[aj ]]pkσ · [[uk]]pkσ ;
10 [[s′j ]]pkσ ← SET([[aj ]]pkσ , [[m]]pkσ );
11 [[a′′j ]]pkσ ← SET([[v′i]]pkσ , [[0]]pkσ );
12 [[v′i]]pkσ = [[v
′
i]]pkσ · [[s′j ]]pkσ ;
13 for k = j +m to τi do
14 [[s′′j ]]pkσ ← SAD([[s′′j ]]pkσ , [[wi,θk ]]pkA);
15 [[a′j ]]pkσ ← SMD([[s′j ]]pkσ , [[s′′j ]]pkσ );
16 [[sj ]]pkσ ← SMD([[a′j ]]pkσ , [[a′′j ]]pkσ );
17 [[Wi]]pkσ = [[Wi]]pkσ · [[sj ]]pkσ ;
18 [[vi]]pkσ ← SET([[v′i]]pkσ , [[0]]pkσ );
19 [[Wi]]pkσ = [[Wi]]pkσ · ([[vi]]pkσ )MWeight;
20 set [[WT Pi]]pkA = ([[Qi]]pkA , [[Yi]]pkA , [[Wi]]pkσ );
21 else
22 [[Wi]]pkσ = [[MWeight]]pkσ ;
23 Return [[WTP]]pkA = ([[WT P1]]pkA , · · · , [[WT Pn]]pkA).
According to design principle 2, secure treatment
procedure weight calculation protocol (TPW) takes
MWeight, [[Φ]]pkB , [[TP]]pkA as input, and outputs
the encrypted weighted treatment procedures
[[WTP]]pkA = ([[WT P1]]pkA , · · · , [[WT Pn]]pkA) with
[[WT Pi]]pkA = ([[Qi]]pkA , [[Yi]]pkA , [[Wi]]pkσ ), where the
elements [[Qi]]pkA , [[Yi]]pkA in [[WT Pi]]pkA are the same as
that in [[T Pi]]pkA , and [[Wi]]pkσ is the calculated treatment
procedure weight. TPW is shown in Algorithm 3 and
elaborated in supplemental material C-3.
The result of TPW is classified into the following scenarios.
(1) If patient B’s illness condition set [[Φ]]pkB does not appear
in the treatment procedure [[T Pi]]pkA , we have [[Wi]]pkσ =
[[MWeight]]pkσ . (2) If [[Φ]]pkB appears at least one time
5
in [[T Pi]]pkA , we have [[Wi]]pkσ = [[Στik=j¯+mwi,θk ]]pkσ , and
([[qi,θj¯ ]]pkA , · · · , [[qi,θj¯+m−1 ]]pkA) is the first-match state set.
D. Secure Treatment Procedure Expansion and Selection
Secure Treatment Procedure Expansion. To uniform the
lengths of weighted treatment procedures, [[WTP]]pkA is con-
verted to [[ETP]]pkA by appending the encrypted dummy
symbols (such as [[⊥]]pkA ) such that the element [[ET Pi]]pkA =
([[Qi]]pkA , [[Yi]]pkA , [[Wi]]pkσ ) in [[ETP]]pkA has |[[Qi]]pkA | =
MState and |[[Yi]]pkA | = MState− 1.
Secure Best Treatment Procedure Selection. According to
design principle 3, the selection task is fulfilled by three
protocols: secure minimum selection protocol (SMin), secure
minimum selection from n treatment procedures protocol
(SMinn) and secure top-k best treatment procedure selection
protocol (BPS-k). SMin selects the best treatment procedure
from two procedures; SMinn leverages SMin as sub-protocol
to select the best one from n treatment procedures; BPS-k
leverages SMinn as sub-protocol to select the top-k most
recommended treatment procedures (with the lowest weights)
in a privacy-preserving way.
1) Secure Minimum Selection Protocol (SMin):
On input [[ET P1]]pkA and [[ET P2]]pkA , SMin outputs
[[ET PMin]]pkσ such that WMin = min(W1,W2), and
[[QMin]]pkσ , [[YMin]]pkσ are the corresponding encrypted
illness states and treatment methods, respectively. It is
required that CP and CSP can not distinguish [[ET PMin]]pkσ
comes from [[ET P1]]pkA or [[ET P2]]pkA .
Step 1: CP calculates [[W ′1]]pkσ = [[W1]]2pkσ · [[1]]pkσ ,
[[W ′2]]pkσ = [[W2]]
2
pkσ
, and flips a random coin s ∈ {0, 1}.
CP randomly selects r′0, r0, r1, r2,i, r3,i ∈ ZN (1 ≤ i ≤
MState − 1) such that L(N)/8 < L(r′0) < L(N)/4 − 1
and L(r0) < L(N)/8. CP calculates
l0 = ([[W
′
2−s]]pkσ )
r′0 · ([[W ′s+1]]pkσ )N−r
′
0 · [[r0]]pkσ ,
l1 = [[Ws+1]]pkσ · ([[W2−s]]pkσ )N−1 · [[r1]]pkσ ,
l2,i ← SAD([[qs+1,i]]pkA · ([[q2−s,i]]pkA)N−1, [[r2,i]]pkσ ),
l3,i ← SAD([[ys+1,i]]pkA · ([[y2−s,i]]pkA)N−1, [[r3,i]]pkσ ).
CP computes l′0 = PD1SK1(l0) and sends (l
′
0, l0, l1, l2,i, l3,i)
to CSP (1 ≤ i ≤MState− 1).
Step 2: CSP calculates l′′0 = PD2SK2(l0, l′0). If L(l′′0 ) >
L(N)/2, CSP sets t = 0 and calculates l4 = [[0]]pkσ , l5,i =
[[0]]pkσ , l6,i = [[0]]pkσ . If L(l′′0 ) < L(N)/2, CSP sets t = 1
5[[Φ]]pkB may appear more than one time in [[T Pi]]pkA due to that loop may
exist.
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and calculates l4 = CR(l1), l5,i = CR(l2,i), l6,i = CR(l3,i).
CSP sends ([[t]]pkσ , l4, l5,i, l6,i) to CP.
Step 3: CP calculates
[[WMin]]pkσ = [[W2−s]]pkσ · l4 · ([[t]]pkσ )N−r1 ,
[[qMin,i]]pkσ ← SAD([[q2−s,i]]pkA , l5,i) · ([[t]]pkσ )N−r2,i ,
[[yMin,i]]pkσ ← SAD([[y2−s,i]]pkA , l6,i) · ([[t]]pkσ )N−r3,i ,
[[q0]]pkσ ← SAD([[q0]]pkA , [[0]]pkσ ),
and sets [[ET PMin]] = ([[QMin]], [[YMin]], [[WMin]]), where
[[QMin]] = ([[q0]], [[qMin,1]], · · · , [[qMin,MState−1]]), [[YMin]] =
([[yMin,1]], · · · , [[yMin,MState−1]]).6
The detail of SMin is depicted in Fig. 14, and the correct-
ness is elaborated in supplemental material C-4.
2) Secure Minimum Treatment Selection from n (SMinn):
On input [[ETP]]pkA = ([[ET P1]]pkA , · · · , [[ET Pn]]pkA),
SMinn outputs [[ET PMin]]pkσ such that WMin =
min(W1, · · · ,Wn), and [[QMin]]pkσ , [[YMin]]pkσ are the
corresponding encrypted illness states and treatment methods,
respectively. It is required that CP and CSP cannot distinguish
[[ET PMin]]pkσ comes from which element in [[ETP]]pkA .
Fig. 8 shows the procedure to get [[ET PMin]]pkσ using
SMin as sub-protocol. The best treatment procedure is se-
lected between two adjacent procedures in each layer, which
executes continuously until it reaches the top.
• • •
• • •
•
•
•
•
•
•
??????? ???????
????????????? ?????????????
???????
?????????????
?? ??
2 Apk
?? ??? ??
1 Apk
?? ? ??? ?? An pk−?? ? ?? ?? An pk?? ?
?? ???
1 pkΣ
?? ? ??? ???n 2 pkΣ?? ?
?? ??
Min pkΣ
?? ?
Fig. 8: Running Procedure of SMinn
3) Secure Top-k Treatment Selection (BPS-k): Taken as
input [[ETP]]pkA , BPS-k (shown in Algorithm 4) outputs
[[ETPMin]]pkσ = ([[ET PMin1 ]]pkσ , · · · , [[ET PMink ]]pkσ ) such
that WMin1 , · · · ,WMink are the top-k lowest weights, and
[[QMini ]]pkσ , [[YMini ]]pkσ are the corresponding encrypted ill-
ness states and treatment methods for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. It is
required that CP and CSP cannot distinguish the elements in
[[ETPMin]]pkσ comes from which elements in [[ETP]]pkA . The
basic idea of BPS-k is to find the treatment procedure with the
lowest weight in each round. Then, multiply the corresponding
weight with MWeight, and set the other weights unchanged.
After k rounds, top-k best treatment procedures are found.
The correctness of BPS-k is elaborated in supplemental
material C-5, and a toy example is given in Fig. 15 to illustrate
the workflow.
VII. SECURITY AND DESIGN GOAL ANALYSIS OF P-MED
This section proves the security of the subprotocols and the
security of P-Med. It is also analyzed that the design goal of
P-Med is achieved.
6The encryption key pkσ is omitted here to simplify the expression.
Algorithm 4: SECURE TOP-k BEST TREATMENT PROCE-
DURES SELECTION (BPS-k)
Input: [[ETP]]pkA .
Output: [[ETPMin]]pkσ .
1 Set S = [[ETP]]pkA ;
2 for i = 1 to k do
3 CP and CSP jointly calculate
[[ET PMini ]]pkσ ← SMinn(S);
4 for j = 1 to n do
5 CP randomly selects rj ∈ ZN and computes
lj = ([[WMini ]]pkσ )
rj · ([[Wj ]]pkσ )N−rj ,
l′j = PD1SK1(lj), where L(rj) < L(N)/4− 1;
6 Permute (lj , l′j) using permutation function pii and get
(lpii(j), l
′
pii(j)
) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, which are sent to CSP;
7 CSP computes l′′pii(j) = PD2SK2(lpii(j), l
′
pii(j)
);
8 If l′′pii(j) = 0, set Apii(j) = [[MWeight]]pkσ ; otherwise,
Apii(j) = [[1]]pkσ . CSP sends Apii(j) to CP, 1 ≤ j ≤ n;
9 CP obtains (A1, · · · , An) by using permutation pi−1i ;
10 Refresh ([[W1]]pkσ , · · · , [[Wn]]pkσ ) in S by computing
[[Wj ]]pkσ ← SMD([[Wj ]]pkσ , Aj), 1 ≤ j ≤ n;
11 Return [[ETPMin]]pkσ .
A. Security of Subprotocols
Theorem 1. TPT is secure against semi-honest (non-
colluding) attackers A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2) and the adversary
A∗ defined in the attack model.
Proof. All data calculated in TPT are encrypted using PCTD
encryption, and not decrypted by CP or CSP in the processing
process. Due to the security of PCTD in [14], TPT is secure
against attackers A,A∗. 
Theorem 2. SSM is secure against semi-honest (non-
colluding) attackers A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2) and the adversary
A∗ defined in the attack model.
Proof. SSM calls SRC, SMD, SLT, SGT and SET as subpro-
tocol, which are proved secure in [15]–[17]. All data calculated
in SSM are encrypted using PCTD. Thus, SSM is secure against
the attackers A,A∗. 
Theorem 3. TPW is secure against semi-honest (non-
colluding) attackers A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2) and the adversary
A∗ defined in the attack model.
Proof. TPW calls SSM, SET, SAD and SMD as subprotocol,
which are proved in the above theorems and [15], [16]. All
data calculated in TPW are encrypted using PCTD. Thus, TPW
is secure against attackers A,A∗. 
Theorem 4. SMin is secure against semi-honest (non-
colluding) attackers A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2) and the adversary
A∗ defined in the attack model.
Proof. Please see supplemental materials D-1.
Theorem 5. SMinn is secure against semi-honest (non-
colluding) attackers A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2) and the adversary
A∗ defined in the attack model.
Proof. SMinn protocol calls SMin as subprotocol, which
is proved secure in Theorem 4. Thus, SMinn is also secure
against attackers A,A∗. 
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Theorem 6. BPS-k is secure against (non-colluding) attack-
ers A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2) and the adversary A∗ defined in
the attack model.
Proof. Please see supplemental materials D-2.
B. Security of P-Med Framework
Here, we utilize the attack model to demonstrate that P-
Med can resist the adversary A∗. 1) If A∗ eavesdrops on
the transmission between the hospital and CP, and on the
transmission between the challenge patient and CP, all data
transmitted in these two links are obtained by A∗, which
includes encrypted NFA-based medical model, encrypted ill-
ness states and encrypted treatment result. Moreover, the
intermediate calculated ciphertext (obtained by executing SSM,
TPW, SMin,SMinn and BPS-k protocols) that are transmitted
between CP and CSP can also be eavesdropped by A∗.
However, since these data are encrypted by PCTD before
transmission, A∗ cannot derive the medical model without
knowing hospital’s secret key nor decrypt challenge patient’s
ciphertext without knowing the challenge patient’s secret key.
2-3) Assume A∗ compromise CP (or CSP) to obtain the partial
strong private key λ1 (or λ2), but A∗ cannot compromise
CP and CSP concurrently. A∗ could not get the strong secret
key λ since it is randomly split into two parts using SKeyS
algorithm of PCTD. Even when CSP is compromised and the
intermediate result in the protocols of P-Med are obtained,
A∗ cannot get any useful information since the “blinding”
method [22] is applied to conceal the plaintext: a random
number is added to or multiplied with the plaintext before
transmitted to CSP. 4) If A∗ obtains the secret keys of the
patients (except the challenge patient), A∗ cannot decrypt the
challenge patient’s ciphertext since the secret keys of different
patients are irrelevant.
C. Design Goal Analysis
P-Med has achieved the design goals that are proposed in
Section III-C, which is analyzed below.
Medical Model and Data Confidentiality. According to
Section VII-B, although an adversary A∗ eavesdrops all com-
munications, A∗ still can not obtain the medical model and
patient’s medical data, which guarantees the confidentiality.
Treatment Recommendation Confidentiality. According to
Section VII-B, although an attacker A∗ compromises CP
or CSP, A∗ still can not get: the illness state match result
in SSM/TPW, the state transitions process in TPT/TPW, the
treatment procedure weights in TPW/SMin/SMinn/BPS-k and
the treatment recommendation result in BPS-k.
Soundness. P-Med realizes completeness for finding out all
the match treatment procedures since all the procedures are
traversed in TPT, weighted in TPW and ranked in BPS-k.
P-Med is correct to return the top-k best procedures, which
is guaranteed by the correctness of BPS-k and analyzed in
supplemental material C-5.
VIII. SECURE ERROR-TOLERANT GENE MATCHING
BASED ON NFA
DFA and NFA can be leveraged as the modeling tool for
many other applications: pattern matching [27], search on
genome [10], [28], internet protocol parsing [29], deep packet
inspection [30], [32], regular expressions search [31], [32],
etc. Here, we focus on privacy-preserving NFA based error-
tolerant gene matching (P-Gene).
Human Desoxyribo-Nucleic Acid (DNA) is a double helix
structured molecule to carry genetic instructions for growth
and development. Since genes may mutate and cause disease,
DNA diagnosis is an exciting new frontier to discover predis-
position to various diseases for medical diagnosis. However,
the disclosure of patient’s DNA may pose significant risks
to individual privacy, and incur genome-based discrimination.
Due to business or safety concerns (such as bio-terrorism), the
exact DNA pattern of pathogene should also be kept confiden-
tial for healthcare providers. Therefore, the privacy of both
sides should be kept rigorously. In this section, we leverage
Ukkonen NFA model to construct a privacy-preserving error-
tolerant gene matching scheme for mutant gene detection or
virus genome detection.
The Ukkonen NFA [28], [33] is a type of NFA arranged in
grid, where each row i denotes the number of errors tolerated.
Suppose an Ukkonen NFA contains (µ+ 1)× (m+ 1) states,
where µ is the error-tolerance degree and m is the number of
symbols contained in a pattern. We represent the state at row
i and column j as qi,j , where 0 ≤ i ≤ µ and 0 ≤ j ≤ m. The
state q0,0 is the initial state, and the states in the rightmost
column are accepting states, i.e., F = (q0,m, · · · , qµ,m). The
arrows labeled as Σ represent transitions induced by any
symbol in Σ. The transitions in Ukkonen NFA are categorized
into the following types.
• Horizontal arrows from qi,j to qi,j+1 denote matching a
symbol in the pattern, which are called h-trans (horizontal
transitions).
• Vertical arrows from qi,j to qi+1,j denote inserting a
symbol in the pattern, which are called v-trans (vertical
transitions).
• Solid diagonal arrows from qi,j to qi+1,j+1 denote replac-
ing a symbol in the pattern by an element from Σ, which
are called Σ-d-trans (Σ induced diagonal transitions).
• Dashed diagonal arrows from qi,j to qi+1,j+1 denote
deleting a symbol in the pattern, which are called ε-d-
trans (ε induced diagonal transitions).
• The Σ-d-trans and ε-d-trans are called d-trans (diagonal
transitions), which can be induced by any symbol in Σ
or ε. The d-trans can always be triggered with or without
symbol input, which is a unconditional transition.
In humans, factor VIII (an essential blood-clotting protein)
is encoded by the F8 gene, and defects in F8 gene result
in hemophilia A (a recessive X-linked coagulation disorder).
According to NCBI database7, human F8 gene sequence
contains “GCT TAG TGC TGA GCA CAT CCA GTG GGT
AAA GTT CCT TAA AAT GCT CTG CAA AGA AAT ...”.
We take the first 9 nucleobases “GCT TAG TGC” in F8 gene
as a DNA pattern to construct its error tolerant Ukkonen NFA
7NCBI: National Center for Biotechnology Information of U.S.
NCBI reference sequence of F8 gene: NM 000132.3.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/nuccore/NM 000132.
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model in Fig. 9, where the symbol set Σ = {A,C,G, T} and
the error-tolerance degree µ = 2.
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Fig. 9: Ukkonen DFA of F8 Gene Sequence Fragment
Suppose the DNA pattern is Ψ = {ψ1, · · · , ψm} and its
error tolerant model is represented by Ukkonen NFA, and the
searched symbol sequence is Φ = {φ1, · · · , φn}. If qi,m is
the accepted state in the matching algorithm, it indicates that
the Hamming distance (edit distance) between Ψ and Φ is i.
To construct a privacy-preserving error-tolerant gene matching
protocol (P-Gene) based on Ukkonen NFA, we define an
encrypted transition matrix E to represent the state transition
diagram. The element Eqi,j→qi′,j′ = [[eqi,j→qi′,j′ ]]pkA in E
denotes the state transition between qi,j and qi′,j′ , which is
assigned different values in diverse situations (shown in the
following equation).
eqi,j→qi′,j′ =

ψj′ , if (i
′ = i)&(j′ = j + 1),
0, if (i′ = i+ 1)&(j′ = j or j + 1),
1, otherwise.
• It equals [[ψi]]pkA for the h-trans (qi,j → qi,j+1), which
indicates the symbol ψi induced the transition.
• It equals [[0]]pkA for the v-trans (qi,j → qi+1,j) and the
d-trans (qi,j → qi+1,j+1).
• It equals [[1]]pkA for the other situations, which indicates
no transition is possible.
To record the state transition induced by a sequence of
symbols, we define an encrypted active state matrix
S = {Si,j = [[si,j ]]pkσ |0 ≤ i ≤ µ, 0 ≤ j ≤ m}.
The element Si,j equals [[0]]pkσ indicating that the state qi,j is
activated; otherwise, it equals [[1]]pkσ .
The secure error-resistant DNA match protocol is proposed
in Algorithm 5. The input includes encrypted DNA pattern
[[Ψ]]pkA = ([[ψ1]]pkA , · · · , [[ψm]]pkA), encrypted DNA sequence
[[Φ]]pkB = ([[φ1]]pkB , · · · , [[φn]]pkB ), encrypted transition ma-
trix E (constructed from [[Ψ]]pkA ) and encrypted active state
matrix S, where the elements in S are initialized to be
[[0]]pkσ (for S0,0) and [[1]]pkσ (otherwise). The protocol out-
puts [[FS ]]pkσ = (S0,m, · · · , Sµ,m), which are the encrypted
activation states of F = (q0,m, · · · , qµ,m). If si,m = 0 for
some accept state qi,m ∈ F (0 ≤ i ≤ µ), it indicates [[Φ]]pkB
is accepted by the model.
Each encrypted symbol [[φk]]pkB (1 ≤ k ≤ n) in DNA
sequence [[Φ]]pkB may induce the state transition and activation
(in line 1) in the following ways.
• For row i = 0 and column j = 1 · · ·m, the state q0,j
is activated (i.e., s0,j = 0) if (s0,j−1 = 0)&(φk = ψj),
which is executed in line 2-4.
• For row i = 1, · · · , µ and column j = 1 · · ·m, the state
qi,j is activated (i.e., si,j = 0) if si−1,j−1 = 0 or si−1,j =
0 or (si,j−1 = 0)&(φk = ψj), which is calculated in line
5-11.
Algorithm 5: PRIVACY-PRESERVING ERROR-RESISTANT
GENE MATCH PROTOCOL (P-GENE)
Input: DNA pattern [[Ψ]]pkA = ([[ψ1]]pkA , · · · , [[ψm]]pkA),
DNA sequence [[Φ]]pkB = ([[φ1]]pkB , · · · , [[φn]]pkB ),
transition matrix E, active state matrix S.
Output: [[FS ]]pkσ .
1 for k = 1 to n do
2 for j = 1 to m do
3 B0 ← SUT(φk, Eq0,j−1→q0,j );
4 S0,j ← SAD(S0,j−1, B0);
5 for i = 1 to µ do
6 for j = 1 to m do
7 B0 ← SUT(φk, Eqi,j−1→qi,j );
8 B1 ← SAD(Si,j−1, B0);
9 B2 ← SMD(Si−1,j−1, Si−1,j);
10 B3 ← SMD(Si,j−1, B2);
11 Si,j ← SMD(B1, B3);
12 Set [[FS ]]pkσ = (S0,m, · · · , Sµ,m);
13 Return [[FS ]]pkσ .
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Fig. 10: Illustration of Gene Match Protocol
Figure 10 illustrates the state activation process for the
two conditions. In P-Gene, the secure unequal test protocol
SUT([[X]]pkA , [[Y ]]pkB ) equals [[1]]pkσ for X 6= Y , and equals
[[0]]pkσ for X = Y .
In Fig. 11, we take DNA pattern Ψ = (G,C, T ) to construct
the Ukkonen DFA model with µ = 2. The DNA sequence for
testing is Φ = (G,G, C,A, T ), which has two errors compared
with Ψ. The steps in Fig. 11 show the activation process of
states induced by inputting the symbols φk (1 ≤ k ≤ n) in Φ.
The red circles indicate the activated states in current step, and
the purple circles indicate the activated states in the last steps.
The red arrows represent the effective activated transitions
induced by the sequence Φ = (G,G, C,A, T ).
IX. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This subsection presents the experiment and theoretical
analysis of the performance of P-Med. A comparison is made
among P-Med and other related schemes. The P-Gene protocol
is tested using real dataset in NCBI in Section IX-A.
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Fig. 11: State Transition for Gene Matching
A. Experiment Analysis
We evaluate the impact factors of the performance of P-Med
on a PC with Intel(R) Core(TM) i9-7920X CPU@2.9GHz, 32
GB RAM, and a custom simulator built in Java. To achieve 80-
bit security level [23], it is necessary to choose the parameter
L(N) = 1024. In the programming, thread pool technology is
utilized to optimize the parallel operation.
The performance of TPT is irrelevant with the bit length of
the crypto parameter N , since the encrypted illness states and
treatment methods are simply deemed as vertexes and edges in
a graphically represented medical model [[M]]pkA , respectively.
Due to that TPT is independently executed by CP, there is
no communication overhead in TPT. There are three factors
that impact the computation overhead of TPT, namely: 1) the
complexity of the NFA-based medical model [[M]]pkA , 2) the
maximum visit time MV isit, and 3) the maximum illness
state number MState.
The complexity of the medical model can be measured by
the parameters in the NFA-based graph of [[M]]pkA , i.e., the
total number of the vertexes (V ertNum), the number of ac-
TABLE III: Performance of TPT
VertNum MV isit MState Time (ms)
10
1 10 0.036
2 10 0.046
3 10 0.064
20
1 20 0.132
2 20 0.823
3 20 2.543
30
1 30 0.649
2 30 23.324
3 30 114.008
40
1 40 7.328
2 40 4,857
3 40 33,844
50
1 50 16.433
2 50 19,783
3 50 226,898
TABLE IV: Performance of SMin (L(N) = 1024)
MState Computation (s) Communication (MB)
10 4.418 0.363
20 8.866 0.721
30 14.267 1.079
40 19.276 1.437
50 23.347 1.795
cept states, indegree and outdegree of each vertex, the number
of loops and self-loops. Table III shows the performance of
TPT, where the computation cost increases with V ertNum,
MV isit, MState. In the test, we randomly generate 1000
medical model graphs for each pair of parameters to get the
average TPT execution time, where each generated graph has
one initial state, two accept states, two indegrees and two
outdegrees for each vertex, two loops and two self-loops.
According to the experimental test, it consumes 226,898 ms (≈
3.782 minutes) to traverse all the treatment procedures when
the medical model contains 50 vertexes (i.e. illness states).
Since TPT is executed only once by CP and the result is
stored in the cloud, the computation cost is appropriate for
real application.
The computation and communication costs of SSM, TPW,
SMin SMinn and BPSk increase with L(N), due to that
PCTD needs more time (and space) to calculate on (and store)
the encrypted data. Fig. 12(a)-12(b) show the performance
of SSM, TPW, SMin with MState = 10, m = 3, n = 1.
When L(N) = 1024, it takes 2.343/42.427/4.418 seconds
(0.104/2.503/0.363 MB) to run SSM, TPW, SMin. Fig. 12(c)-
12(d) show that the performance of TPW also increases with m
and the average illness state number AVG(TP) of TP, where
AVG(TP) = (∑ni=1 θτi)/n and θτi is the illness states number
in T Pi. It costs 7.461 minutes (27.201 MB) for TPW to
calculate a treatment procedure weight when AVG(TP) = 50,
m = 5 and L(N) = 1024. The performance of SMin (Table
IV) increases with MState, and it costs 23.347 seconds (1.795
MB) to run SMin when MState = 50, L(N) = 1024. From
Fig. 12(e)-12(h), we observe that the performance of SMinn
and BPSk increases with n and MState. When n = 100,
MState = 50, L(N) = 1024, it takes 19.018/21.531 minutes
14
(177.625/178.266 MB) to run SMinn/BPSk.
In the analysis, we test on diverse medical models with n =
40, 60, 80, 100. Since the performance of P-Med increases with
m and AVG(TP), we select AVG(TP) = 10, 20, 30, 40, 50
and m = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 to evaluate P-Med for each medical
model, respectively. Fig. 12(i)-Fig. 12(j) show the computa-
tion/communication cost of P-Med (n = 100), and it takes
33.689 minutes (2898 MB) to get the encrypted best treatment
procedure in P-Med when AVG(TP) = 50,m = 5.
Then, we utilize the F8 gene sequence in NCBI database
to test the performance of P-Gene protocol, and the computa-
tion/communication overheads are shown in Fig. 12(k)-12(l).
Suppose a Ukkonen NFA model is constructed from a DNA
pattern with length m and error-tolerant degree µ. The length
n of DNA sequence that can be accepted by this model should
be in the range m−µ ≤ n ≤ m+µ. It is obvious that the cost
of P-Gene is affected by m, n and µ. In the experiment, we
set (m,µ) ∈ {(10, 2), (20, 4), (30, 6), (40, 8), (50, 10)}, and
select n ∈ {m−µ,m,m+µ} for diverse values of (m,µ). For
m = 50 and µ = 10, the experiment result shows that it takes
35.197/43.996/52.795 minutes (424.619/543.274/651.929 MB)
to get the error-tolerant DNA matching result when n =
40, 50, 60, respectively. The detailed experiment data of Fig.
12 is given in Table VI-X in supplemental materials E.
B. Theoretical Analysis
Computation Overhead: Assume that one exponentiation
calculation with an exponent of length L(N) requires ap-
proximately 1.5L(N) multiplication calculations [24] (e.g. the
computation of ga with L(a) = L(N) requires 1.5L(N)
multiplications, and denoted as 1.5L(N) muls). Compared
with exponentiation calculation, the computation overhead
of addition and multiplication are negligible. In PCTD, the
operations Enc, WDec, SDec, PD1, PD2 and CR need
4.5L(N), 1.5L(N), 1.5L(N), 4.5L(N), 4.5L(N) and 3L(N)
muls, respectively. An exponentiation computation with a
PCTD ciphertext as base number and an exponent of length
L(N) is approximately 3L(N) muls. Basic protocols SAD,
SMD, SGE, SLE, SLT, SGT, SET and SRC need 48L(N),
85.5L(N), 36L(N), 36L(N), 36L(N), 36L(N), 57L(N) and
157.5L(N) muls, respectively. In P-Med, the computation
overhead of TPT is influenced by the complexity of the
medical model and the parameters MV isit, MState, which
is irrelevant with the exponent operation and bit length of N .
SSM needs O(L(N)) muls and most of the computations can
be concurrently calculated in practice. It takes O(n·AVG(TP)·
L(N)) muls to run TPW, O(MState · L(N)) muls to run
SMin, O(MState · dlog2ne · L(N)) muls to run SMinn, and
O(MState · dlog2ne · k · L(N)) muls to run BPS-k. Finally,
it takes O((n ·AVG(TP)+MState · dlog2ne ·k) ·L(N)) muls
for P-Med to select the top-k best treatment procedures.
Communication Overhead: In PCTD, the transmission over-
head of a ciphertext [[m]]pk and partial decrypted cipher-
text C(1)1 are 4L(N) and 2L(N) bits, respectively. Basic
protocols SAD, SMD, SGE, SLE, SLT, SGT, SET and SRC
cost 16L(N), 36L(N), 10L(N), 10L(N), 10L(N), 10L(N),
20L(N) and 56L(N) bits, respectively. In P-Med, it costs
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O(n ·AVG(TP) · L(N)) bits to run TPW, O(MState · L(N))
bits to run SMin, O(MState · dlog2ne · L(N)) bits to run
SMinn, and O(MState·dlog2ne·k·L(N)) bits to run BPS-k.
Finally, it takes O((n·AVG(TP)+MState·dlog2ne·k)·L(N))
bits for P-Med to select the top-k best treatment procedures.
C. Comparative Analysis
A comparison (Table V) is made among P-Med and finite
automata based diagnosis schemes [10], [25], IoT based di-
agnosis schemes [2], [4] and machine learning (ML) based
diagnosis schemes [34], [35], [37]. DFA is used in scheme
[25] to make medical diagnosis without privacy protection,
while the scheme in [10] and P-Med are constructed based on
NFA using homomorphic encryption. In [10], NFA describes
the linear structured DNA string and leaks the input symbol
type in the test algorithm; in P-Med, NFA describes a com-
plex nonlinear cyclic/acyclic medical model and information
leakage is avoided. The IoT-based disease diagnosis systems
in [2], [4] do not have any security protection.
TABLE V: Comparison
P-Med [25] [10] [2] [4] [34] [35] [37]
F1 X X X × × × × ×
F2 X × × X X × × ×
F3 X N.A. N.A. X X × × X
F4 X N.A. N.A. X X × X ×
F5 X × X × × X X X
F6 X × × × × × × X
F7 X × × × × × × ×
F8 X × × × × × × ×
F9 X × × × × × × ×
F10 X × × × × × × ×
F1: finite automata based model F2: IoT-based diagnosis
F3: single communication round (user & server)
F4: patient independent query F5: privacy preserving
F6: strong security level F7: avoid information leakage
F8: treatment recommendation F9: top-k best treatment ranking
F10: authorization mechanism
The schemes in [34], [35], [37] requires a large medical
dataset to train the classifier using machine learning algorithm,
and the trained classifier makes decisions using disease pre-
diction algorithm. The design conception of P-Med is quite
different from the schemes in [34], [35], [37]: P-Med makes
use of medical model (designed by the hospital) and patient’s
successive illness states to realize diagnosis and treatment.
The schemes in [34] and [35] does not realize strong security
level since they leak the parameters of the classifier to the
server to enable online diagnosis. In addition, [34] and [35]
require multiple rounds of communications between patient
and cloud in the disease prediction algorithm. The patients in
[34], [37] cannot independently query the diagnosis service,
and the hospital is a necessary bridge. In P-Med, the patient
could independently issue a medical query and the interaction
between patient and CP is a single round.
Furthermore, all the compared schemes [2], [4], [10], [25],
[34], [35], [37] leak the diagnosis result or intermediate
result to the cloud server. On the contrary, P-Med keeps the
intermediate calculation result and treatment recommendation
secret, and the servers can not distinguish the result comes
from which treatment procedure in the selection algorithm.
Although machine learning-based models have great po-
tential for improving healthcare quality, machine learning
algorithms usually operate as black boxes, and it is not clear
how do they make predictions. The patients and doctors are
reluctant to trust a system as a black box. On the contrary,
DFA/NFA based treatment models are derived from clinical
practice guidelines, which is an explainable method to con-
vince professional medical workers.
On the other hand, machine learning-based privacy-
preserving systems train the parameters of the model using
forward/backward propagation algorithms. The parameters are
repeatedly calculated in the training process, which results
in the accuracy decrease. For instance, the scheme in [39]
designed a privacy-preserving deep neural network for medical
image denoising. The peak signal to noise ratio (PSNR) of
the security scheme is 0.25-0.27 dB lower than the plaintext
method. A privacy-preserving single/multiple layers neural
network system was constructed in [38] for clinical decision.
Since [38] utilizes a piecewise polynomial function to fit
the nonlinear activation function for neural networks, the
performance analysis in [38] shows that the error rate increases
0.2% compared with the plaintext algorithm. Different from
these ML-based schemes, the DFA/NFA based treatment mod-
els do not involve parameter training process nor nonlinear
activation functions. Therefore, the accuracy of the encrypted-
domain is the same as for the plaintext-domain in P-Med.
It is a promising research topic to integrate the advantages of
DFA/NFA based medical model and machine learning to make
the clinical decision process interpretable and more accurate.
X. RELATED WORK
A cloud and IoT based disease diagnosis framework is
proposed in [2] to analyze the data generated by medical
IoT devices and predict the potential disease with its level
of severity. Fuzzy rule based neural classifier is utilized in
[4] to construct a cloud and IoT based mobile healthcare
application for monitoring and diagnosing the diseases. A
real-time patient-centric application is constructed in [7] to
assist the treatment of post-discharge patient by a discrete-
event dynamic system. A clinical decision support system
is designed in [9] to manage the treatment of patients with
gestational diabetes, which makes use of finite automata
to determine the patient’s metabolic condition and generate
therapy adjustment recommendations. These schemes realize
online diagnosis and treatment based on plaintext medical data,
where privacy preserving mechanism is not provided.
The privacy concerns should essentially be considered to
prevent the probable disclosure of the sensitive medical data
and diagnosis/treatment result. Yang et al. [26] put forth a
lightweight traceable scheme for securely sharing electronic
health records, which protects the privacy of medical data. The
machine learning methods are introduced in secure medical
analytic and diagnosis. A support vector machine and Paillier
homomorphic encryption based clinical decision support sys-
tem was designed in [34], which requires multiple rounds of
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interaction between the server and clinician in the diagnosis.
A privacy-preserving online medical pre-diagnosis framework
was suggested in [35] based on nonlinear kernel support
vector machine, which utilizes multi-party random masking
and polynomial aggregation techniques. Lin et al. [36] utilized
historical medical data of patients to train recurrent neural
networks (RNN), and the trained RNN model made predictive
diagnosis decisions. The scheme proposed in [36] leverages
Paillier homomorphic encryption to train the healthcare model,
and bilinear pairing techniques to authenticate message. Zhang
et al. [37] presented a privacy-preserving disease prediction
system based on single-layer perceptron learning and random
matrices algorithm, which includes disease learning phase and
prediction phase. A privacy-preserving multiple-layer neural
network was designed in [38] to support clinical decision,
and a secure piecewise polynomial calculation protocol was
proposed to fit the non-linear activation function. The deep
neural network (DNN) model was introduced to healthcare
to construct a secure image denoising system [39], which
bridges lightweight additive secret sharing and garbled circuits
to execute the multi-party computation. Liang et al. [40]
was suggested a privacy-preserving decision tree classification
scheme to provide online diagnosis service. It transforms
the outsourced decision tree classification issue to encrypted
data retrieval problem, such that searchable encryption can
be utilized to search on a set of decision paths. A secure
reinforcement learning system was proposed in [41] to enable
privacy-preserving dynamic treatment decision making, which
was constructed based on additive homomorphic encryption
primitive.
Personalized medicine [42] may analyze the DNA infor-
mation of the patient to make diagnosis and treatment de-
cisions. Blanton et al. [43] constructed a privacy-preserving
outsourced error-resilient DNA search scheme via oblivious
evaluation of finite automata, where the genetic test pattern
is represented as a finite automata and the DNA sequence
is deemed as the input. During the test process, both the
pattern and DNA sequence are kept secret. Keshri et al. [44]
presented an automated method of Epileptic Spike detection
in Electroencephalogram (EEG), and the system functionality
was modeled with DFA. Lewis et al. [25] combined DFA
and knowledge discovery technology in data mining TV-
tree to construct a platform to discover epileptiform activity
from Electroencephalograms (EEG), which could predict the
interictal spikes within noise to be the predictors of the
clinical onset of a seizure. Mohassel et al. [45] designed an
oblivious DFA evaluation scheme with application to secure
DNA pattern matching. Selvakumar et al. [46] utilized DFA
to observe the cholesterol metabolism with the accept and
reject states and proposed a monitoring procedure based on
DFA, which is used to enhance the diagnostic procedures
and conventional treatment in cholesterol metabolic disorders.
Sasakawa et al. [10] suggested an oblivious evaluation method
of NFA based on homomorphic encryption with secure circuit
evaluation method, which is applicable to privacy-preserving
virus genome detection. However, the solution requires multi-
ple communication rounds between NFA holder and genome
data holder.
XI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a secure medical diagnosis and
treatment framework named as P-Med that can be used to
recommend therapy methods to the patients according to their
illness states. The medical model in P-Med is constructed
based on NFA, encrypted and outsourced to cloud. The patient
submits successive several days of encrypted mIoT data to
issue a query and get the top-k best treatment recommen-
dations using secure selection algorithm. A secure illness
state match protocol is also designed in P-Med to achieve
quantitative secure comparison between the state in medical
model and patient’s illness state that are monitored by mIoT.
Moreover, secure NFA evaluation method in P-Med reduces
the interaction between cloud and patient to a single round.
Finally, we evaluate the security and performance of P-Med.
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1SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
A. Basic Primitives
A-1. Paillier Cryptosystem with Threshold Decryption: The
Paillier cryptosystem with threshold decryption (PCTD) [13],
[14] is the basic primitive in P-Med.
KeyGen: Let κ be the security parameter and p, q be two
large prime numbers such that L(p) = L(q) = κ. Let N = pq
and λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1) 8. Define a function L(x) = x−1N
and select a generator g of order ord(g) = (p− 1)(q − 1)/2.
The system public parameter is PP = (g,N). The master
secret key of the system is SK = λ. A user i in the system is
assigned a secret key ski ∈ ZN and a public key pki = gski
mod N2.
Encryption (Enc): On input a plaintext m ∈ ZN , a
user randomly selects r ∈ ZN and uses his public key pki
to encrypt m to ciphertext [[m]]pki = (C1, C2), in which
C1 = pk
r
i (1 +mN) mod N
2 and C2 = gr mod N2.
Decryption with ski (WDec): On input ciphertext [[m]]pki
and secret key ski, the message can be recovered by computing
m = L(C1/C
ski
2 mod N
2).
Decryption with master secret key (SDec): Using master
secret key SK = λ of the system, any ciphertext [[m]]pki
encrypted by any public key can be decrypted by computing
Cλ1 = (pk
r
i )
λ(1 + mNλ) = (1 + mNλ) mod N2. Since
gcd(λ,N) = 1 holds 9, we have m = L(Cλ1 mod N
2)λ−1
mod N.
Master secret key splitting (SKeyS): The master secret
key SK = λ can be randomly split into two parts SK1 = λ1
and SK2 = λ2 such that λ1+λ2 ≡ 0 mod λ and λ1+λ2 ≡ 1
mod N2.
Partial Decryption with SK1 (PD1): On input the cipher-
text [[m]]pki = (C1, C2), we can use SK1 = λ1 to compute
C
(1)
1 = (C1)
λ1 = (pkri )
λ1(1 +mNλ1) mod N
2.
Partial Decryption with SK2 (PD2): On input [[m]]pki and
C
(1)
1 , we can use SK2 = λ2 to compute C
(2)
1 = (C1)
λ2 =
(pkri )
λ2(1+mNλ2) mod N
2. The message can be recovered
by computing m = L(C(1)1 · C(2)1 ).
Ciphertext Refresh (CR): Refresh a ciphertext [[m]]pki =
(C1, C2) to a new ciphertext [[m′]]pki = (C
′
1, C
′
2) such that
m = m′. It select a random r′ ∈ ZN and calculates C ′1 =
C1 · (pki)r′ mod N2, C ′2 = C2 · gr
′
mod N2.
It is easy to verify that PCTD is additive homomorphic
[[m1]]pki · [[m2]]pki = [[m1 +m2]]pki and scalar-multiplicative
homomorphic ([[m]]pki)r = [[r ·m]]pki , ∀r ∈ ZN . Specifically,
([[m]]pki)
(N−1) = [[−m]]pki when r = N − 1.
A-2. Secure Addition Protocol (SAD): Given two encrypted
data [[x]]pkA and [[y]]pkB under two different public keys pkA
and pkB , respectively, SAD [16] securely computes [[x+y]]pkσ :
Step-1(@CP): CP selects random rx, ry ∈ ZN , calculates
X = [[x]]pkA · [[rx]]pkA = [[x+ rx]]pkA , Y = [[y]]pkB · [[ry]]pkB =
8lcm : lowest common multiple.
9gcd: greatest common divider.
[[y+ry]]pkB , X1 = PD1SK1(X), Y1 = PD1SK1(Y ), and sends
X , Y , X1, Y1 to CSP.
Step-2(@CSP): Using partial secret key SK2, CSP calcu-
lates X2 = PD2SK2(X,X1), Y2 = PD2SK2(Y, Y1), computes
S = X2 + Y2 and sends [[S]]pkσ to CP.
Step-3(@CP): CP computes R = rx + ry and calculates
[[S]]pkσ · ([[R]]pkσ )N−1 = [[S −R]]pkσ = [[x+ y]]pkσ .
A-3. Secure Multiplication Protocol (SMD): Given two en-
crypted data [[x]]pkA and [[y]]pkB , SMD [16] securely computes
[[x · y]]pkσ :
Step-1(@CP): CP selects random rx, ry, Rx, Ry ∈ ZN ,
calculates X = [[x]]pkA · [[rx]]pkA = [[x+ rx]]pkA , Y = [[y]]pkB ·
[[ry]]pkB = [[y+ry]]pkB , S = [[Rx]]pkA ·([[x]]pkA)N−ry = [[Rx−
ry · x]]pkA , T = [[Ry]]pkB · ([[y]]pkB )N−rx = [[Ry − rx · y]]pkB .
X1 = PD1SK1(X), Y1 = PD1SK1(Y ), S1 = PD1SK1(S),
T1 = PD1SK1(T ), and sends X , Y , S, T , X1, Y1, S1, T1 to
CSP.
Step-2(@CSP): Using partial secret key SK2, CSP cal-
culates h = PD2SK2(X,X1) · PD2SK2(Y, Y1), S2 =
PD2SK2(S, S1), T2 = PD2SK2(T, T1), H = [[h]]pkσ , S3 =
[[S2]]pkσ , T3 = [[T2]]pkσ and sends H,S3, T3 to CP. It is obvious
that h = (x+ rx)(y + ry).
Step-3(@CP): Once H,S3, T3 are received, CP computes
S4 = ([[rx · ry]]pkσ )N−1, S5 = ([[Rx]]pkσ )N−1 and S6 =
([[Ry]]pkσ )
N−1, and calculates H · T3 ·S3 ·S4 ·S5 ·S6 = [[h+
(Rx−ry ·x)+(Ry−rx ·y)−rx ·ry−Rx−Ry]]pkσ = [[x·y]]pkσ .
A-4. Secure greater or Equal Protocol (SGE): Given [[x]]pkA
and [[y]]pkB , SGE [17] securely computes [[u
∗]]pkσ such that
u∗ = 1 if x ≥ y and u∗ = 0 if x < y.
Step 1: CP calculates [[x′]]pkA = ([[x]]pkA)2 ·[[1]]pkA = [[2x+
1]]pkA [[y
′]]pkB = ([[y]]pkB )
2 = [[2y]]pkB , , and chooses random
r1, r2, s.t. L(r1) < L(N)/4− 1,L(r2) < L(N)/8. Then, CP
flips a coin s ∈ {0, 1} randomly. CP and CSP jointly execute
the following operations.
If s = 1, [[γ]]pkσ ← SAD(([[x′]]pkA)r1 , ([[y′]]pkB )N−r1).
If s = 0, [[γ]]pkσ ← SAD(([[y′]]pkB )r1 , ([[x′]]pkA)N−r1).
Then, CP calculates l = [[γ]]pkσ · [[r2]]pkσ and l′ =
PD1SK1(l) and sends (l, l
′) to CSP.
Step 2: CSP decrypts l′′ = PD2SK2(l, l′). If L(l′′) >
L(N)/2, CSP denotes u′ = 0; otherwise, u′ = 1. Then, CSP
uses pkσ to encrypt u′, and sends [[u′]]pkσ to CP.
Step 3: Receiving [[u′]]pkσ , CP computes as follows: if
s = 1, CP denotes [[u∗]]pkσ = CR([[u
′]]pkσ ); otherwise, CP
computes [[u∗]]pkσ = [[1]]pkσ · ([[u′]]pkσ )N−1 = [[1− u′]]pkσ .
A-5. Secure Less or Equal Protocol (SLE): Given [[x]]pkA
and [[y]]pkB with L(x),L(y) < L(N)/8, SLE [17] securely
computes [[u∗]]pkσ such that u
∗ = 1 if x ≤ y and u∗ = 0 if
x > y.
Step 1: CP calculates [[x′]]pkA = ([[x]]pkA)2 = [[2x]]pkA ,
[[y′]]pkB = ([[y]]pkB )
2 · [[1]]pkB = [[2y + 1]]pkB , and chooses
random r1, r2, s.t. L(r1) < L(N)/4 − 1,L(r2) < L(N)/8.
Then, CP flips a coin s ∈ {0, 1} randomly. CP and CSP jointly
execute the following operations.
If s = 1, [[γ]]pkσ ← SAD(([[y′]]pkB )r1 , ([[x′]]pkA)N−r1).
If s = 0, [[γ]]pkσ ← SAD(([[x′]]pkA)r1 , ([[y′]]pkB )N−r1).
Then, CP calculates l = [[γ]]pkσ · [[r2]]pkσ and l′ =
PD1SK1(l) and sends (l, l
′) to CSP.
2Step 2: CSP decrypts l′′ = PD2SK2(l, l′). If L(l′′) >
L(N)/2, CSP denotes u′ = 0; otherwise, u′ = 1. Then, CSP
uses pkσ to encrypt u′, and sends [[u′]]pkσ to CP.
Step 3: Receiving [[u′]]pkσ , CP computes as follows: if
s = 1, CP denotes [[u∗]]pkσ = CR([[u
′]]pkσ ); otherwise, CP
computes [[u∗]]pkσ = [[1]]pkσ · ([[u′]]pkσ )N−1 = [[1− u′]]pkσ .
A-6. Secure Less Than Protocol (SLT): Given [[x]]pkA and
[[y]]pkB with L(x),L(y) < L(N)/8, SLT [16], [17] securely
computes [[u∗]]pkσ such that u
∗ = 1 if x < y and u∗ = 0 if
x ≥ y.
Step 1 and Step 2 are the same as in SGE protocol.
Step 3: Once [[u′]]pkσ is received, CP computes as follows:
if s = 1, CP denotes [[u∗]]pkσ = [[1]]pkσ · ([[u′]]pkσ )N−1 =
[[1− u′]]pkσ . otherwise, CP computes [[u∗]]pkσ = CR([[u′]]pkσ );
A-7. Secure Greater Than Protocol (SGT): Given [[x]]pkA
and [[y]]pkB with L(x),L(y) < L(N)/8, SGT [17] securely
computes [[u∗]]pkσ such that u
∗ = 1 if x > y and u∗ = 0 if
x ≤ y.
Step 1 and Step 2 are the same as in SLE protocol.
Step 3: Once [[u′]]pkσ is received, CP computes as follows:
if s = 1, CP denotes [[u∗]]pkσ = [[1]]pkσ · ([[u′]]pkσ )N−1 =
[[1− u′]]pkσ . otherwise, CP computes [[u∗]]pkσ = CR([[u′]]pkσ );
A-8. Secure Equivalence Testing Protocol (SET): Given
[[x]]pkA and [[y]]pkB with L(x),L(y) < L(N)/8, SET
[17] securely computes [[u∗]]pkσ such that u
∗ = 1 if
x = y and u∗ = 0 if x 6= y. CP and CSP jointly
computes [[u1]]pkσ ← SLE([[x]]pkA , [[y]]pkB ), [[u2]]pkσ ←
SLE([[y]]pkB , [[x]]pkA), [[u
∗]]pkσ ← SMD([[u1]]pkσ , [[u2]]pkσ ).
A-9. Secure Range Comparison Protocol (SRC): Given
[[x]]pkA , [[y1]]pkB and [[y2]]pkB with L(x),L(y1),L(y2)<
L(N)/8, SRC10 [17] securely computes [[u∗]]pkσ ←
SRC([[x]]pkA , [[y1]]pkB , [[y2]]pkB ) such that u
∗ = 1 if y1 ≤
x ≤ y2 and u∗ = 0 otherwise. CP and CSP jointly
computes [[u1]]pkσ ← SGE([[x]]pkA , [[y1]]pkB ), [[u2]]pkσ ←
SLE([[x]]pkB , [[y2]]pkA), [[u
∗]]pkσ ← SMD([[u1]]pkσ , [[u2]]pkσ ).
B. Security Model and Proof
Here we recall the security model for securely realizing
an ideal functionality in the presence of non-colluding semi-
honest adversaries [20], [21]. For simplicity, we do it for
the specific scenario of our functionality, which involve the
patient/hospital (a.k.a ”D1”), CP (a.k.a ”S1”) and CSP (a.k.a
”S2”). We refer the readers to [20] for the general case
definitions.
Let P = (D1, S1, S2) be the set of all protocol parties.
We consider three kinds of adversaries (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2) that
corrupt D1, S1 and S2, respectively. In the real world, D1
runs on input x and y (with additional auxiliary inputs zx and
zy), while S1 and S2 receive auxiliary inputs z1 and z2. Let
H ⊆ P be the set of honest parties. Then, for every P ∈ H ,
let outP be the output of party P , whereas if P is corrupted,
i.e. P ∈ P\H , then outP denotes the view of P during the
protocol Π.
10SRCis SRT1 (secure range test protocol type-1) in [17].
For every P ∗ ∈ P , the partial view of P ∗ in a real-world
execution of protocol Π in the presence of adversaries A =
(AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2) is defined as
REALP
∗
Π,A,H,z(κ, x, y) = {outP : P ∈ H} ∪ outP∗ ,
where κ ∈ N is the security parameter.
In the ideal world, there is an ideal functionality f for a
function f and the parties interact only with f. Here, the
challenge user sends x and y to f. If any of x or y is ⊥,
then f returns ⊥. Finally, f returns f(x, y) to the challenge
user. As before, let H ⊆ P be the set of honest parties. Then,
for every P ∈ H , let outP be the output returned by f to
party P , whereas if P is corrupted, outP is the same value
returned by P .
For every P ∗ ∈ P , the partial view of P ∗ in an ideal-world
execution in the presence of independent simulators Sim =
(SimD1 , SimS1 , SimS2) is defined as
IDEALP
∗
f,Sim,H,z(κ, x, y) = {outP : P ∈ H} ∪ outP∗ .
Informally, a protocol Π is considered secure against non-
colluding semi-honest adversaries if it partially emulates, in
the real world, an execution of f in the ideal world. More
formally,
Definition 1. Let f be a deterministic functionality among
parties in P . Let H ⊆ P be the subset of honest parties in P .
We say that Π securely realizes f if there exists a set Sim =
(SimD1 , SimS1 , SimS2) of PPT transformations (SimD1 =
SimD1(AD1) and so on) such that for all semi-honest PPT
adversaries A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2), for all inputs x, y and
auxiliary inputs z, and for all parties P ∈ P it holds
{REALP∗Π,A,H,z(κ, x, y)}κ∈N
c≈ {IDEALP∗f,Sim,H,z(κ, x, y)}κ∈N,
where
c≈ denotes computational indistinguishability.
C. Protocol Elaborations
C-1. Elaboration of SSM: Secure illness state match proto-
col (SSM) is elaborated below.
1) Line 1. Initializes [[u∗]]pkσ = [[1]]pkσ .
2) Line 2. If the patient B’s body temperature BTB
is within the range [BTA,1, BTA,2], i.e., BTA,1 ≤
BTB ≤ BTA,2, we have [[u1]]pkσ = [[1]]pkσ ; otherwise,
[[u1]]pkσ = [[0]]pkσ .
3) Line 3-5. Blood pressure is usually expressed in
terms of the systolic pressure (maximum during one
heart beat) over diastolic pressure (minimum between
two heart beats), and is measured in millimeters of
mercury (mmHg). If the patient B’s blood pressure
BPB,1/BPB,2 is within the range [BPA,1/BPA,2,
BPA,3/BPA,4], i.e., BPA,1 ≤ BPB,1 ≤ BPA,3
and BPA,2 ≤ BPB,2 ≤ BPA,4, we have
[[u2,1]]pkσ = [[u2,2]]pkσ = [[1]]pkσ and [[u2]]pkσ =
SMD([[u2,1]]pkσ , [[u2,2]]pkσ ) = [[u2,1 · u2,2]]pkσ = [[1]]pkσ .
Otherwise, we have [[u2,1]]pkσ = [[0]]pkσ or [[u2,2]]pkσ =
[[0]]pkσ , and [[u2]]pkσ = [[0]]pkσ .
34) Line 6. The blood glucose level is the amount of glucose
present in the blood of humans, and is measured in
mmol/L (millimoles per litre). If B’s blood glucose
level BGB is within the range [BGA,1, BGA,2], i.e.,
BGA,1 ≤ BGB ≤ BGA,2, we have [[u3]]pkσ = [[1]]pkσ ;
otherwise, [[u3]]pkσ = [[0]]pkσ .
5) Line 7. The respiratory rate is the rate at which breathing
occurs, and it is usually measured in breaths per minute.
If the patient B’s respiratory rate RRB is larger than
RRA, we have [[u4]]pkσ = [[1]]pkσ ; otherwise, [[u4]]pkσ =
[[0]]pkσ .
6) Line 8. The heart rate is the speed of the heartbeat
measured by the number of contractions of the heart
per minute. If the patient B’s heart rate HRB is less
than HRA, we have [[u5]]pkσ = [[1]]pkσ ; otherwise,
[[u5]]pkσ = [[0]]pkσ .
7) Line 9-11. A symptom is a departure from normal
function or feeling which is noticed by a patient,
reflecting the presence of an unusual state, or of a
disease. If the patient B’s symptoms SB,1 = SA,1 and
SB,2 = SA,2, we have [[u6,1]]pkσ = [[u6,2]]pkσ = [[1]]pkσ
and [[u6]]pkσ = [[u6,1 · u6,2]]pkσ = [[1]]pkσ . Otherwise,
we have [[u6,1]]pkσ = [[0]]pkσ or [[u6,2]]pkσ = [[0]]pkσ , and
[[u6]]pkσ = [[0]]pkσ .
8) Line 12-13. If the patient B’s illness state φ in [[φ]]pkB
matches the state q in [[q]]pkA , we have [[ui]]pkσ = [[1]]pkσ
(for ∀i ∈ [[1, 6]]) and [[u∗]]pkσ = [[1]]pkσ . Otherwise,
there exists j ∈ [[1, 6]] such that [[uj ]]pkσ = [[0]]pkσ , and
thus [[u∗]]pkσ = [[0]]pkσ .
C-2. Elaboration of TPT:
1) Line 1. The two-dimensional arrays value(·, ·) and
weight(·, ·) are initialized according to the state tran-
sition table of the encrypted NFA [[M]]pkB . Take the
encrypted NFA shown in Fig. 5 and the state transition
table shown in Table II as an example. value4,1 =
[[y4]]pkA indicates that the encrypted treatment method
[[y4]]pkA could lead the current state [[q4]]pkA to transit to
the next state [[q1]]pkA . weight4,1 = [[w4]]pkA indicates
that the encrypted transition weight (from [[q4]]pkA to
[[q1]]pkA ) is [[w4]]pkA .
2) Line 2-9. The stacks Q, Y and W are initialized to be
empty. The total treatment procedure number n is ini-
tialized to be zero. The arrays count(·) and visit(·, ·, ·)
are initialized to be 0. Push [[q0]]pkB into Q, and add 1
to count0.
3) Line 10. If the stack Q is not empty, execute the
following operations.
4) Line 11. Let α be top element in Q. The integer β is
initialized to be −1.
5) Line 12-14. Execute the operations introduced in step 2
of the basic idea. If such state exists, β is set to be the
index of the found state and visitcount[α],α,β is set to
be 1 indicating the corresponding edge is visited.
6) Line 15-21. If β = −1, it indicates that the state
(described in step 2 of the basic idea) is not found. Then,
for the encrypted state [[qα]] that appears the countα-th
time in the stack R, set all the transitions starting from
[[qα]] to be unvisited. Pop α from Q, and minus 1 from
countα. Pop the top element in stacks Y and W if the
stacks are not empty.
7) Line 22-23. If β 6= −1 and countβ < MV isit, it
indicates that the state (described in step 2 of the basic
idea) exits and β is set to be the number of the found
state. Push the encrypted state [[qβ ]]pkA into stack Q,
push the encrypted treatment method valueα,β into stack
Y , and push the edge weight wα,β into stack W . Then,
add 1 to countβ .
8) Line 24-25. If the stack Q is not empty, denote the top
element in Q as α′.
9) Line 26-28. If [[qα′ ]]pkA belongs to [[F ]]pkB , it indicates
that a path from [[q0]]pkA to [[F ]]pkA is found. Add 1 to
the total treatment procedure number n. The encrypted
states along the path are stored in [[Qn]]pkA , the en-
crypted treatment methods are stored in [[Yn]]pkA , and
the encrypted transition weights are stored in [[Wn]]pkA .
Then, pop the top elements in Q, Y , W and minus 1
from countα′ .
10) Line 29-30. If [[qα′ ]]pkA does not belong to [[F ]]pkA and
Q achieves the maximum state number MState, pop
the top element in stacks Q, Y , W and minus 1 from
countα′ .
C-3. Elaboration of TPW: TPW calculates the encrypted
weight [[Wi]]pkA for each treatment procedure [[T Pi]]pkA (1 ≤
i ≤ n), which is elaborated below.
1) Line 1-2. For each treatment procedure T Pi (1 ≤ i ≤
n), initialize the weight Wi = 0, the temporary variables
vi = 1 and v′i = 0. vi indicates whether [[Φ]]pkB is
found in [[T Pi]]pkA . If it is not found, vi = 1; otherwise,
vi = 0. v′i indicates the number of times that [[Φ]]pkB is
found in [[T Pi]]pkA .
2) Line 3 and 21-22. If the intermediate state number in
T Pi is equal or greater than m, go to steps 4-20 to
search for the match states. Otherwise, the weight Wi is
set to be MWeight since T Pi does not match with Φ.
3) Line 4. Try to find m successive encrypted illness
states [[Qi,θj ,m]]pkA = ([[qi,θj ]]pkA , · · · , [[qi,θj+m−1 ]]pkA)
in T Pi that match [[Φ]]pkB . Since the encrypted ill-
ness state set in T Pi is denoted as [[Qi]]pkA =
([[q0]]pkA , [[qi,θ1 ]]pkA , · · · , [[qi,θτi ]]pkA), TPW searches for
the m successive states from q0 to qi,θτi−m .
4) Line 5. Initialize the temporary variables sj = 0, s′j = 0
and s′′j = 0.
• s′j indicates whether [[Φ]]pkB and [[Qi,θj ,m]]pkA
match. If they match, s′j = 1; otherwise, s
′
j = 0.
• s′′j is utilized to calculate the sum of the tran-
sition weights from the illness state qi,θj+m−1 to
the accept illness state qi,θτi , and the sum equals
Στik=j+mwi,θk .
• sj equals to 0 or Στik=j+mwi,θk . If [[Φ]]pkB
and [[Qi,θj ,m]]pkA match, and [[Φ]]pkB appears for
the first time in [[T Pi]]pkA , we have sj =
Στik=j+mwi,θk ; otherwise, sj = 0.
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Fig. 13: A Toy Example to Illustrate Workflow of TPW
5) Line 6. Initialize the temporary variables aj = 0, a′j = 0
and a′′j = 1.
• aj calculates the number of match states of [[Φ]]pkB
and [[Qi,θj ,m]]pkA .
• a′j is a temporary variable to compute [[sj ]]pkσ =
[[s′j · s′′j · v′′i ]]pkσ .
• a′′j equals 1 or 0. For j = 0, we have a
′′
j = 1. For
1 ≤ j ≤ θτi−m, if there exists j′ ∈ [0, j) satisfying
that [[Qi,θj′ ,m]]pkA and [[Φ]]pkB match, we have a′′j =
0; otherwise, a′′j = 1.
6) Line 7-9. Calculate the number of match states in
[[Φ]]pkB and [[Qi,θj ,m]]pkA , and the result is stored in
[[aj ]]pkσ .
7) Line 10. If aj = m, we have s′j = 1 indicating that
[[Φ]]pkB and [[Qi,θj ,m]]pkA match. Otherwise, s′j = 0.
8) Line 11. If v′i 6= 0, we have a′′j = 0, which indicates
that [[Φ]]pkB has already appeared in [[T Pi]]pkA before
the j-th round search. Otherwise, a′′j = 1.
9) Line 12. If [[Φ]]pkB and [[Qi,θj ,m]]pkA match, add s′j = 1
to v′i; otherwise, add s
′
j = 0 to v
′
i.
10) Line 13-14. s′′j is the sum of the transition weights from
the θj+m−1-th illness state to the accept illness state,
and s′′j = Σ
τi
k=j+mwi,θk after the for-loop calculation in
line 13-14.
11) Line 15-16. Calculate [[sj ]]pkσ = [[s
′
j · s′′j · a′′j ]]pkσ .
• If s′j = 0, we have [[sj ]]pkσ = [[0]]pkσ .
• If [[s′j ]]pkσ = [[1]]pkσ and [[a
′′
j ]]pkσ = [[1]]pkσ , it
indicates that [[Φ]]pkB appears for the first time in
[[T Pi]]pkA , and we have [[sj ]]pkσ = [[s′′j ]]pkσ =
[[Στik=j+mwi,θk ]]pkσ .
• If [[s′j ]]pkσ = [[1]]pkσ and [[a
′′
j ]]pkσ = [[0]]pkσ , it indi-
cates that [[Φ]]pkB has already appeared in [[T Pi]]pkA
before the j-th round search, and we have [[sj ]]pkσ =
[[0]]pkσ .
12) Line 17. Calculate [[Wi + sj ]]pkσ and the result is
stored in [[Wi]]pkσ . If [[Φ]]pkB is found in T Pi, we
have [[Wi]]pkσ = [[Σ
τi
k=j¯+m
wi,θk ]]pkσ after the for-loop
calculation in line 3-16, where [[Qi,θj¯ ,m]]pkA is the first-
match state set. Otherwise, [[Wi]]pkσ = [[0]]pkσ .
13) Line 18. If v′i = 0, we have vi = 1, which indicates that
[[Φ]]pkB is not found in T Pi. Otherwise, vi = 0.
514) Line 19. If [[Φ]]pkB is not found in T Pi, we have
[[Wi]]pkσ · ([[vi]]pkσ )MWeight
=[[0]]pkσ · ([[1]]pkσ )MWeight = [[MWeight]]pkσ .
If it is found, we have
[[Wi]]pkσ · ([[vi]]pkσ )MWeight
=[[Wi]]pkσ · ([[0]]pkσ )MWeight
=[[Στi
k=j¯+m
wi,θk ]]pkσ ,
where [[Qi,θj¯ ,m]]pkA is the first-match state set.
15) Line 20. Set the i-th weighted treatment procedure as
[[WT Pi]]pkA = ([[Qi]]pkA , [[Yi]]pkA , [[Wi]]pkσ ).
Next, we use the toy example (in Fig. 4) to illustrate the
workflow of TPW in Fig. 13. Three treatment procedures
(T P1, T P4 and T P6) in Section IV.D are selected to analyze
the change of internal variables in security protocol TPW.
Since patient’s illness state set Φ = (φ1, φ2, φ3) matches with
(q1, q3, q4) in Fig. 4, T P1 is a treatment procedure does not
match with Φ. The match state set (q1, q3, q4) appears two
times in T P4 and one time in T P6. These three cases are
analyzed in detail below.
The treatment procedure T P1 is depicted as q0 ,w1−−−→
q1
y1,w3−−−→ q3 y3,w6−−−→ q3 y3,w7−−−→ q4 y6,w10−−−−→ q6. According to
the symbolic representation in Algorithm 3, we have i = 1,
θτi = 5, m = 3, θτi −m− 1 = 1. Then, the variable j should
traverse from 0 to 1.
1) For j = 0, line 5-17 checks whether q1
y1,w3−−−→ q3 y3,w6−−−→
q3 in T P1 matches with Φ = (φ1, φ2, φ3). Since they
mismatch with each other, the internal variable changes:
• vi = 1: indicates Φ is not yet found in T P1;
• v′i = 0: indicates the number of times that Φ is
found in T P1 is still 0;
• s′j = 0: indicates Φ and Q1,θ0,3 = (q1, q3, q3) (in
T P1) do not match;
• s′′j = w7 + w10: calculates the sum of weights in
q3
y3,w7−−−→ q4 y6,w10−−−−→ q6;
• a′′j = 1: indicates Φ is not yet found in T P1 for
even one time;
• sj = s′j ·s′′j ·a′′j = 0: is calculated according to Line
15-16;
• Wi ←Wi+ sj = 0: is calculated according to Line
17.
2) For j = 1, line 5-17 checks whether q3
y3,w6−−−→ q3 y3,w7−−−→
q4 in T P1 matches with Φ = (φ1, φ2, φ3). Since they
mismatch with each other, the internal variable changes:
• vi = 1: indicates Φ is not yet found in T P1;
• v′i = 0: indicates the number of times that Φ is
found in T P1 is still 0;
• s′j = 0: indicates Φ and Q1,θ1,3 = (q3, q3, q4) (in
T P1) do not match;
• s′′j = w10: calculates the sum of weights in
q4
y6,w10−−−−→ q6;
• a′′j = 1: indicates Φ is not yet found in T P1 for
even one time;
• sj = s′j ·s′′j ·a′′j = 0: is calculated according to Line
15-16;
• Wi ←Wi+ sj = 0: is calculated according to Line
17.
3) After the loops, the weight of T P1 is calculated as
W1 ← W1 + vi ·MWeight = 0 + 1× 10000 = 10000
(according to Line 19).
The treatment procedure T P4 is depicted as q0 ,w1−−−→
q1
y1,w3−−−→ q3 y3,w7−−−→ q4 y4,w4−−−→ q1 y1,w3−−−→ q3 y3,w7−−−→ q4 y6,w10−−−−→
q6. According to the symbolic representation in Algorithm 3,
we have i = 4, θτi = 7, m = 3, θτi −m − 1 = 3. Then, the
variable j should traverse from 0 to 3.
1) For j = 0, line 5-17 checks whether q1
y1,w3−−−→ q3 y3,w7−−−→
q4 in T P4 matches with Φ = (φ1, φ2, φ3). Since they
match, the internal variable changes:
• vi = 0: indicates Φ is found in T P4;
• v′i = 1: indicates the number of times that Φ is
found in T P4 is 1;
• s′j = 1: indicates Φ and Q4,θ0,3 = (q1, q3, q4) (in
T P4) match;
• s′′j = w4 + w3 + w7 + w10: calculates the sum of
weights in q4
y4,w4−−−→ q1 y1,w3−−−→ q3 y3,w7−−−→ q4 y6,w10−−−−→
q6;
• a′′j = 1: indicates Φ is found in T P4 for the first
time (a′′j will change to 0 in the following loops);
• sj = s′j · s′′j · a′′j = s′′j : is calculated according to
Line 15-16;
• Wi ←Wi+sj = w4 +w3 +w7 +w10: is calculated
according to Line 17.
2) For j = 1, line 5-17 checks whether q3
y3,w7−−−→ q4 y4,w4−−−→
q1 in T P4 matches with Φ = (φ1, φ2, φ3). Since they
mismatch with each other, the internal variable changes:
• vi = 0: indicates Φ is found in T P4;
• v′i = 1: indicates the number of times that Φ is
found in T P4 is 1;
• s′j = 0: indicates Φ and Q4,θ1,3 = (q3, q4, q1) (in
T P4) do not match;
• s′′j = w3 +w7 +w10: calculates the sum of weights
in q1
y1,w3−−−→ q3 y3,w7−−−→ q4 y6,w10−−−−→ q6;
• a′′j = 0: indicates Φ is already found in T P4 for at
least one time;
• sj = s′j ·s′′j ·a′′j = 0: is calculated according to Line
15-16;
• Wi ←Wi+sj = w4 +w3 +w7 +w10: is calculated
according to Line 17.
3) For j = 2, line 5-17 checks whether q4
y4,w4−−−→ q1 y1,w3−−−→
q3 matches with Φ = (φ1, φ2, φ3). Since they mismatch
with each other, the internal variable changes:
• vi = 0: indicates Φ is found in T P4;
• v′i = 1: indicates the number of times that Φ is
found in T P4 is 1;
• s′j = 0: indicates Φ and Q4,θ2,3 = (q4, q1, q3) (in
T P4) do not match;
• s′′j = w7 + w10: calculates the sum of weights in
q3
y3,w7−−−→ q4 y6,w10−−−−→ q6;
6• a′′j = 0: indicates Φ is already found in T P4 for at
least one time;
• sj = s′j ·s′′j ·a′′j = 0: is calculated according to Line
15-16;
• Wi ←Wi+sj = w4 +w3 +w7 +w10: is calculated
according to Line 17.
4) For j = 3, line 5-17 checks whether q1
y1,w3−−−→ q3 y3,w7−−−→
q4 in T P4 matches with Φ = (φ1, φ2, φ3). Since they
match, the internal variable changes:
• vi = 0: indicates Φ is found in T P4;
• v′i = 1: indicates the number of times that Φ is
found in T P4 is 2;
• s′j = 1: indicates Φ and Q4,θ3,3 = (q1, q3, q4) (in
T P4) match;
• s′′j = w10: calculates the sum of weights in
q4
y6,w10−−−−→ q6;
• a′′j = 0: indicates Φ is already found in T P4 for at
least one time;
• sj = s′j ·s′′j ·a′′j = 0: is calculated according to Line
15-16;
• Wi ←Wi+sj = w4 +w3 +w7 +w10: is calculated
according to Line 17.
5) After the loops, the weight of T P4 is
calculated as W4 ← W4 + vi · MWeight =
(w4+w3+w7+w10)+0×10000 = w4+w3+w7+w10.
The treatment procedure T P6 is depicted as q0 ,w1−−−→
q1
y1,w3−−−→ q3 y3,w7−−−→ q4 y4,w4−−−→ q1 y1,w3−−−→ q3 y3,w9−−−→ q6.
According to the symbolic representation in Algorithm 3, we
have i = 6, θτi = 6, m = 3, θτi − m − 1 = 2. Then, the
variable j should traverse from 0 to 2.
1) For j = 0, line 5-17 checks whether q1
y1,w3−−−→ q3 y3,w7−−−→
q4 in T P6 matches with Φ = (φ1, φ2, φ3). Since they
match, the internal variable changes:
• vi = 0: indicates Φ is found in T P6;
• v′i = 1: indicates the number of times that Φ is
found in T P6 is 1;
• s′j = 1: indicates Φ and Q6,θ0,3 = (q1, q3, q4) (in
T P6) match;
• s′′j = w4 + w3 + w9: calculates the sum of weights
in q4
y4,w4−−−→ q1 y1,w3−−−→ q3 y3,w9−−−→ q6;
• a′′j = 1: indicates Φ is found in T P6 for the first
time (a′′j will change to 0 in the following loops);
• sj = s′j · s′′j · a′′j = s′′j : is calculated according to
Line 15-16;
• Wi ← Wi + sj = w4 + w3 + w9: is calculated
according to Line 17.
2) For j = 1, line 5-17 checks whether q3
y3,w7−−−→ q4 y4,w4−−−→
q1 in T P6 matches with Φ = (φ1, φ2, φ3). Since they
mismatch with each other, the internal variable changes:
• vi = 0: indicates Φ is found in T P6;
• v′i = 1: indicates the number of times that Φ is
found in T P6 is 1;
• s′j = 0: indicates Φ and Q6,θ1,3 = (q3, q4, q1) (in
T P6) do not match;
• s′′j = w3 + w9: calculates the sum of weights in
q1
y1,w3−−−→ q3 y3,w9−−−→ q6;
• a′′j = 0: indicates Φ is already found in T P6 for at
least one time;
• sj = s′j ·s′′j ·a′′j = 0: is calculated according to Line
15-16;
• Wi ← Wi + sj = w4 + w3 + w9: is calculated
according to Line 17.
3) For j = 2, line 5-17 checks whether q4
y4,w4−−−→ q1 y1,w3−−−→
q3 matches with Φ = (φ1, φ2, φ3). Since they mismatch
with each other, the internal variable changes:
• vi = 0: indicates Φ is found in T P6;
• v′i = 1: indicates the number of times that Φ is
found in T P6 is 1;
• s′j = 0: indicates Φ and Q6,θ2,3 = (q4, q1, q3) (in
T P6) do not match;
• s′′j = w9: calculates the sum of weights in q3
y3,w9−−−→
q6;
• a′′j = 0: indicates Φ is already found in T P6 for at
least one time;
• sj = s′j ·s′′j ·a′′j = 0: is calculated according to Line
15-16;
• Wi ← Wi + sj = w4 + w3 + w9: is calculated
according to Line 17.
4) After the loops, the weight of T P6 is
calculated as W6 ← W6 + vi · MWeight =
(w4 + w3 + w9) + 0× 10000 = w4 + w3 + w9.
C-4. Elaboration of SMin: SMin selects the best treatment
procedure (with the lowest weight) from two procedures, and
its correctness is elaborated below.
At the beginning of step 1, CP calculates
[[W ′1]]pkσ = [[W1]]
2
pkσ · [[1]]pkσ = [[2W1 + 1]]pkσ ,
[[W ′2]]pkσ = [[W2]]
2
pkσ = [[2W2]]pkσ .
It is obvious that if W1 < W2, we have W ′1 < W
′
2; if W1 ≥
W2, we have W ′1 > W
′
2.
(1) When the flipped random coin s = 1, we have
l0 = ([[W
′
1]]pkσ )
r′0 · ([[W ′2]]pkσ )N−r
′
0 · [[r0]]pkσ
= [[r′0(W
′
1 −W ′2) + r0]]pkσ ,
l1 = [[W2]]pkσ · ([[W1]]pkσ )N−1 · [[r1]]pkσ
= [[W2 −W1 + r1]]pkσ ,
l2,i ← SAD([[q2,i]]pkA · ([[q1,i]]pkA)N−1, [[r2,i]]pkσ )
= [[q2,i − q1,i + r2,i]]pkσ ,
l3,i ← SAD([[y2,i]]pkA · ([[y1,i]]pkA)N−1, [[r3,i]]pkσ )
= [[y2,i − y1,i + r3,i]]pkσ .
• If W1 < W2, then W ′1 < W
′
2, l
′′
0 > L(N)/2, t = 0
and l4 = [[0]]pkσ , l5,i = [[0]]pkσ , l6,i = [[0]]pkσ . The tuple
([[WMin]]pkσ , [[qMin,i]]pkσ , [[yMin,i]]pkσ ) are calculated as
[[WMin]]pkσ = [[W1]]pkσ · l4 · ([[t]]pkσ )N−r1
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Fig. 14: Workflow of SMin
= [[W1]]pkσ · [[0]]pkσ · ([[0]]pkσ )N−r1
= [[W1]]pkσ ,
[[qMin,i]]pkσ ← SAD([[q1,i]]pkA , l5,i) · ([[t]]pkσ )N−r2,i
= SAD([[q1,i]]pkA , [[0]]pkσ ) · ([[0]]pkσ )N−r2,i
= [[q1,i]]pkσ ,
[[yMin,i]]pkσ ← SAD([[y1,i]]pkA , l6,i) · ([[t]]pkσ )N−r3,i
= SAD([[y1,i]]pkA , [[0]]pkσ ) · ([[0]]pkσ )N−r3,i
= [[y1,i]]pkσ .
• If W1 ≥ W2, then W ′1 > W ′2, l′′0 < L(N)/2, t = 1
and l4 = CR(l1), l5,i = CR(l2,i), l6,i = CR(l3,i). The tuple
([[WMin]]pkσ , [[qMin,i]]pkσ , [[yMin,i]]pkσ ) is calculated as
[[WMin]]pkσ
=[[W1]]pkσ · l4 · ([[t]]pkσ )N−r1
=[[W1]]pkσ · [[W2 −W1 + r1]]pkσ · ([[1]]pkσ )N−r1
=[[W2]]pkσ ,
[[qMin,i]]pkσ
←SAD([[q1,i]]pkA , l5,i) · ([[t]]pkσ )N−r2,i
=SAD([[q1,i]]pkA , [[q2,i − q1,i + r2,i]]pkσ ) · ([[1]]pkσ )N−r2,i
=[[q2,i]]pkσ ,
[[yMin,i]]pkσ
←SAD([[y1,i]]pkA , l6,i) · ([[t]]pkσ )N−r3,i
=SAD([[y1,i]]pkA , [[y2,i − y1,i + r3,i]]pkσ ) · ([[1]]pkσ )N−r3,i
=[[y2,i]]pkσ ,
(2) When the flipped random coin s = 0, we have
l0 = ([[W
′
2]]pkσ )
r′0 · ([[W ′1]]pkσ )N−r
′
0 · [[r0]]pkσ
= [[r′0(W
′
2 −W ′1) + r0]]pkσ ,
l1 = [[W1]]pkσ · ([[W2]]pkσ )N−1 · [[r1]]pkσ
= [[W1 −W2 + r1]]pkσ ,
l2,i ← SAD([[q1,i]]pkA · ([[q2,i]]pkA)N−1, [[r2,i]]pkσ )
= [[q1,i − q2,i + r2,i]]pkσ ,
8l3,i ← SAD([[y1,i]]pkA · ([[y2,i]]pkA)N−1, [[r3,i]]pkσ )
= [[y1,i − y2,i + r3,i]]pkσ .
• If W1 < W2, then W ′1 < W
′
2, l
′′
0 < L(N)/2, t = 1
and l4 = CR(l1), l5,i = CR(l2,i), l6,i = CR(l3,i). The tuple
([[WMin]]pkσ , [[qMin,i]]pkσ , [[yMin,i]]pkσ ) is calculated as
[[WMin]]pkσ
=[[W2]]pkσ · l4 · ([[t]]pkσ )N−r1
=[[W2]]pkσ · [[W1 −W2 + r1]]pkσ · ([[1]]pkσ )N−r1
=[[W1]]pkσ ,
[[qMin,i]]pkσ
←SAD([[q2,i]]pkA , l5,i) · ([[t]]pkσ )N−r2,i
=SAD([[q2,i]]pkA , [[q1,i − q2,i + r2,i]]pkσ ) · ([[1]]pkσ )N−r2,i
=[[q1,i]]pkσ ,
[[yMin,i]]pkσ
←SAD([[y2,i]]pkA , l6,i) · ([[t]]pkσ )N−r3,i
=SAD([[y2,i]]pkA , [[y1,i − y2,i + r3,i]]pkσ ) · ([[1]]pkσ )N−r3,i
=[[y1,i]]pkσ ,
• If W1 ≥ W2, then W ′1 > W ′2, l′′0 > L(N)/2, t = 0
and l4 = [[0]]pkσ , l5,i = [[0]]pkσ , l6,i = [[0]]pkσ . The tuple
([[WMin]]pkσ , [[qMin,i]]pkσ , [[yMin,i]]pkσ ) are calculated as
[[WMin]]pkσ = [[W2]]pkσ · l4 · ([[t]]pkσ )N−r1
= [[W2]]pkσ · [[0]]pkσ · ([[0]]pkσ )N−r1
= [[W2]]pkσ ,
[[qMin,i]]pkσ ← SAD([[q2,i]]pkA , l5,i) · ([[t]]pkσ )N−r2,i
= SAD([[q2,i]]pkA , [[0]]pkσ ) · ([[0]]pkσ )N−r2,i
= [[q2,i]]pkσ ,
[[yMin,i]]pkσ ← SAD([[y2,i]]pkA , l6,i) · ([[t]]pkσ )N−r3,i
= SAD([[y2,i]]pkA , [[0]]pkσ ) · ([[0]]pkσ )N−r3,i
= [[y2,i]]pkσ .
Since the above analysis includes several case by case
discussions (“s = 1 vs. s = 0”, and “W1 < W2 vs.
W1 ≥ W2”), we depict different situations in Figure 14
to make them easy to understand. The above analysis
demonstrates that SMin could correctly output ET PMin
(with the lowest weight) from the two encrypted treatment
procedures.
C-5. Elaboration of BPS-k: BPS-k selects the top-k most
recommended treatment procedures (with the top-k lowest
weights) in a privacy-preserving way, which is elaborated
below.
1) Line 1. The set S is assigned with [[ETP]]pkA .
2) Line 2. BPS-k needs k rounds to get the result. In
each round, the protocol picks up the expanded treatment
procedure with the lowest weight.
3) Line 3. Run SMinn to get the best encrypted treatment
procedure [[ET PMini ]]pkσ (with the lowest weight) in
the i-th round.
4) Line 4-5. For each element in S, CP calculates
lj = ([[WMini ]]pkσ )
rj · ([[Wj ]]pkσ )N−rj
= [[rj(WMini −Wj)]]pkσ .
If Wj = WMini , we have lj = [[0]]pkσ . Otherwise, lj 6=
[[0]]pkσ . Then, CP partially decrypts lj and stores the
result in l′j .
5) Line 6. CP uses a permutation pii to disorder (l1, · · · , ln)
and (l′1, · · · , l′n). Then, {(lpii(j), l′pii(j))} for 1 ≤ j ≤ n
are sends to CSP.
6) Line 7-8. CSP decrypts (lpii(j), l
′
pii(j)
) to get l′′pii(j) for
1 ≤ j ≤ n. If l′′pii(j) = 0, CSP sets Apii(j) =
[[MWeight]]pkσ . Otherwise, Apii(j) = [[1]]pkσ .
7) Line 9. Receiving (Apii(1), · · · , Apii(n)), CP utilizes the
inverse permutation function pi−1i to recover the order
and obtains (A1, · · · , An).
• It easy to find that the origin [[ET Pζ ]]pkA of
[[ET PMini ]]pkσ has Aζ = [[MWeight]]pkσ .
• For 1 ≤ j ≤ n and j 6= ζ, [[ET Pj ]]pkA has Aj =
[[1]]pkσ .
8) Line 10. The set ([[W1]]pkσ , · · · , [[Wn]]pkσ ) in S is re-
freshed.
• The element [[Wζ ]]pkσ in the origin tuple
[[ET Pζ ]]pkA of [[ET PMini ]]pkσ is set to
[[Wζ ·MWeight]]pkσ .
• For 1 ≤ j ≤ n and j 6= ζ, [[Wj ]]pkσ is
unchanged since [[Wj ]]pkσ ← SMD([[Wj ]]pkσ , Aj) =
SMD([[Wj ]]pkσ , [[1]]pkσ ) = [[Wj × 1]]pkσ = [[Wj ]]pkσ .
We give an example in Figure 15 to describe the working
process of BPS-k. Suppose the expanded treatment procedure
set [[ETP]]pkA contains four (n = 4) procedures [[ET Pi]]pkA =
([[Qi]]pkA , [[Yi]]pkA , [[Wi]]pkA), where i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, W1 =
15, W2 = 8, W3 = 17 and W4 = 5. Let k = 2 to select
the top-2 best treatment procedures. Set the maximum weight
MWeight = 100.
1) To select the first best treatment procedure (i = 1), CP
and CSP executes line 3-10 in BPS-k.
• CSP and CP invoke SMinn protocol to get
[[ET PMin1 ]]pkσ in a privacy preserving way, which
is [[ET P4]]pkσ in our example.
• Since n = 4, CP calculates four tuples of (lj , l′j)
for j = {1, 2, 3, 4}:
l1 = [[WMin1 −W1]]pkσ = [[−10]]pkσ ,
l2 = [[WMin1 −W2]]pkσ = [[−3]]pkσ ,
l3 = [[WMin1 −W3]]pkσ = [[−12]]pkσ ,
l4 = [[WMin1 −W4]]pkσ = [[0]]pkσ .
and l′j = PK1SK1(lj).
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Fig. 15: A Toy Example to Illustrate Workflow of BPS-k
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• CP chooses a permutation function pi1 : pi1(1) =
3, pi1(2) = 4, pi1(3) = 2, pi1(4) = 1 to scramble
the above four tuples, which are sent to CSP.
• Receiving the disordered tuples,CSP decrypts
l′′pi1(1) = −12, l′′pi1(2) = 0, l′′pi1(3) = −3, l′′pi1(4) =−10. According to the rule in line 8, CSP computes
Api1(1) = [[1]]pkσ , Api1(2) = [[100]]pkσ , Api1(3) =
[[1]]pkσ , Api1(4) = [[1]]pkσ and sends them to CP.
• The restore the order, CP using pi−11 : pi
−1
1 (1) =
4, pi−11 (2) = 3, pi
−1
1 (3) = 1, pi
−1
1 (4) = 2 to
recover A1 = [[1]]pkσ , A2 = [[1]]pkσ , A3 = [[1]]pkσ ,
A4 = [[100]]pkσ .
• Then, CP calculates
W1 ←W1 ·A1 = 15,
W2 ←W2 ·A2 = 8,
W3 ←W3 ·A3 = 17,
W4 ←W4 ·A4 = 500.
It is obvious that the weights (W1,W2,W3) remain
the same; and the weight of [[ET PMin1 ]]pkσ =
[[ET P4]]pkσ is set to be the largest one. The weights
in set S (containing [[ET P]]pkσ ) are refreshed to the
new ones.
2) To select the second best treatment procedure (i = 2),
CP and CSP executes line 3-10 in BPS-k.
• CSP and CP invoke SMinn protocol to get
[[ET PMin2 ]]pkσ in a privacy preserving way, which
is [[ET P2]]pkσ in our example.
• Since n = 4, CP calculates four tuples of (lj , l′j)
for j = {1, 2, 3, 4}:
l1 = [[WMin1 −W1]]pkσ = [[−7]]pkσ ,
l2 = [[WMin1 −W2]]pkσ = [[0]]pkσ ,
l3 = [[WMin1 −W3]]pkσ = [[−9]]pkσ ,
l4 = [[WMin1 −W4]]pkσ = [[−492]]pkσ .
and l′j = PK1SK1(lj).
• CP chooses a permutation function pi2 : pi2(1) =
2, pi2(2) = 1, pi2(3) = 4, pi2(4) = 3 to scramble
the above four tuples, which are sent to CSP.
• Receiving the disordered tuples,CSP decrypts
l′′pi2(1) = −7, l′′pi2(2) = 0, l′′pi2(3) = −9, l′′pi2(4) =−492. According to the rule in line 8, CSP com-
putes Api2(1) = [[100]]pkσ , Api2(2) = [[1]]pkσ ,
Api2(3) = [[1]]pkσ , Api2(4) = [[1]]pkσ and sends them
to CP.
• The restore the order, CP using pi−12 : pi
−1
2 (1) =
2, pi−12 (2) = 1, pi
−1
2 (3) = 4, pi
−1
2 (4) = 3 to
recover A1 = [[1]]pkσ , A2 = [[100]]pkσ , A3 = [[1]]pkσ ,
A4 = [[1]]pkσ .
• Then, CP calculates
W1 ←W1 ·A1 = 15,
W2 ←W2 ·A2 = 800,
W3 ←W3 ·A3 = 17,
W4 ←W4 ·A4 = 500.
It is obvious that the weights (W1,W2,W3) remain
the same; and the weight of [[ET PMin2 ]]pkσ =
[[ET P2]]pkσ is set to be the largest one. The weights
in set S (containing [[ET P]]pkσ ) are refreshed to the
new ones.
3) Finally, the BPS-k protocol outputs [[ET PMin]]pkσ =
{[[ET P4]]pkσ , [[ET P2]]pkσ} (W4 = 5 and W2 = 8).
D. Protocol Proof
D-1. Proof of SMin: Theorem 4-1. SMin is secure in
the presence of semi-honest (non-colluding) attackers A =
(AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2).
Proof. We now construct the following independent simu-
lators (SimD1 , SimS1 , SimS2).
SimD1 receives ET P1 and ET P2 as inputs and simulates
AD1 as following, where
ET Pi = (Qi,Yi,Wi),
Qi = (q0, qi,θ1 , · · · , qi,MState−1),
Yi = (yi,θ1 , · · · , yi,MState−1),
for i ∈ {1, 2}.
It generates the ciphertext [[ET P1]]pkA and [[ET P2]]pkA ,
where
[[ET Pi]]pkA = ([[Qi]]pkA , [[Yi]]pkA , [[Wi]]pkσ ),
[[Qi]]pkA = ([[q0]]pkA , [[qi,θ1 ]]pkA , · · · , [[qi,MState−1]]pkA),
[[Yi]]pkA = ([[yi,θ1 ]]pkA , · · · , [[yi,MState−1]]pkA),
for i ∈ {1, 2}.
The entire view of AD1 is the received tuples and the
encrypted data. The IND-CPA security of PCTD ensures that
AD1 ’s view is indistinguishable from its view in the real world
execution.
SimS1 simulates AS1 as following. It randomly selects
ˆET P1 and ˆET P2 and encrypts them to [[ ˆET P1]]pkA and
[[ ˆET P2]]pkA . Then, it computes [[Wˆ1]]pkσ = ([[Wˆ1]]pkσ )2 ·
[[1]]pkσ , [[Wˆ2]]pkσ = ([[Wˆ2]]pkσ )
2. SimS1 flips a random coin
s ∈ {0, 1} and computes lˆ0, lˆ1, lˆ2,i, lˆ3,i. Then, utilizing PD1
algorithm, it computes lˆ′0. It randomly selects tˆ ∈ {0, 1} and
computes [[tˆ]]pkσ . It generates random ciphertext lˆ4, lˆ5,i, lˆ6,i.
According to the randomly flipped coins s ∈ {0, 1}, it inputs
([[qˆ1,i]]pkA , [[qˆ2,i]]pkA), ([[yˆ1,i]]pkA , [[yˆ2,i]]pkA), l5,i and l6,i into
SimSADS1 in Ref. [16] and gets [[qˆMin,i]]pkσ , [[yˆMin,i]]pkσ . Then,
SimS1 sends (lˆ
′
0, lˆ0, lˆ1, lˆ2,i, lˆ3,i, lˆ4, lˆ5,i, lˆ6,i, [[tˆ]]pkσ ) and the in-
termediate encrypted data of SimSADS1 to AS1 . If AS1 replies
with ⊥, then SimS1 outputs ⊥. The IND-CPA security of
PCTD ensures that AD1 ’s view is indistinguishable from its
view in the real world execution.
SimS2 simulates AS2 as following. It selects random tˆ ∈
{0, 1}. If tˆ = 0, it calculates lˆ4 = [[0]]pkσ , Cˆ5,i = [[0]]pkσ ,
lˆ6,i = [[0]]pkσ . If tˆ = 1, it generates random encryptions to
be (lˆ4, lˆ5,i, lˆ6,i). For a certain tˆ, the generated ciphertexts are
computationally indistinguishable from the real world due to
the IND-CPA security of PCTD. In real and ideal world, the
views of AS2 are indistinguishable. 
Theorem 4-2. SMin is secure against the adversary A∗
defined in the attack model.
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Proof. The adversary A∗ is assumed to have the following
abilities.
(1) A∗ is assumed to be an outside adversary and eavesdrop
all the communications to get the transmitted data. As
A∗ is assumed to be an outside adversary, A∗ cannot get
hospital A’s secret key skA, patient B’s secret key skB
and B’s authorization secret key skσ . A∗ also cannot get
CP’s partial strong key SK1 and CSP’s partial strong
key SK2.
If A∗ eavesdrops the communication channel, A∗ could
get the encrypted tuples [[ET P1]]pkA and [[ET P2]]pkA
that are transmitted at the beginning of the SMin
protocol, and [[ET PMin]]pkσ that is transmitted at the
end of the protocol. Since [[ET P1]]pkA , [[ET P2]]pkA and
[[ET PMin]]pkσ are encrypted using PCTD, the adver-
sary A∗ cannot recover (Q1,Y1,W1), (Q2,Y2,W2) and
(QMin,YMin,WMin) due to the IND-CPA security of
PCTD.
If A∗ eavesdrops the communication channel be-
tween CP and CSP, A∗ could get (l′0, l0, l1, l2,i, l3,i)
in the end of step 1, and ([[t]]pkσ , l4, l5,i, l6,i) at
the end of step 2. In SMin, these ciphertexts
(l′0, l0, l1, l2,i, l3,i, [[t]]pkσ , l4, l5,i, l6,i) are all encrypted
using the public key pkσ . Since the adversary A∗ does
know the data owner B’s authorization secret key skσ
and the CSP’s partial strong key SK2,A∗ cannot recover
the underlying plaintexts.
(2) A∗ is assumed to compromise CP and get CP’s partial
strong key SK1. But A∗ cannot get CSP’s partial strong
key SK2. A∗ also cannot get hospital A’s secret key
skA, patient B’s secret key skB and B’s authorization
secret key skσ .
In step 1 of SMin, A∗ obtains [[ET P1]]pkA and
[[ET P2]]pkA . A∗ cannot recover (Q1,Y1,W1) and
(Q2,Y2,W2) without the secret keys skσ, skA. In step
3, A∗ obtains ([[t]]pkσ , l4, l5,i, l6,i) from CSP.
If s = 1,
[[WMin]]pkσ
= [[W1]]pkσ · l4 · ([[t]]pkσ )N−r1
=
{
[[W1 + (W2 −W1 + r1)− r1]]pkσ , if t = 1,
[[W1 + 0− 0]]pkσ , if t = 0,
=
{
[[W2]]pkσ , if t = 1,
[[W1]]pkσ , if t = 0,
[[qMin,i]]pkσ
← SAD([[q1,i]]pkA , l5,i) · ([[t]]pkσ )N−r2,i
=

[[q1,i + (q2,i − q1,i + r2,i)− r2,i]]pkσ ,
if t = 1,
[[q1,i + 0− 0]]pkσ , if t = 0,
=
{
[[q2,i]]pkσ , if t = 1,
[[q1,i]]pkσ , if t = 0,
[[yMin,i]]pkσ
← SAD([[y1,i]]pkA , l6,i) · ([[t]]pkσ )N−r3,i
=

[[y1,i + (y2,i − y1,i + r3,i)− r3,i]]pkσ ,
if t = 1,
[[y1,i + 0− 0]]pkσ , if t = 0,
=
{
[[y2,i]]pkσ , if t = 1,
[[y1,i]]pkσ , if t = 0,
If s = 0,
[[WMin]]pkσ
= [[W2]]pkσ · l4 · ([[t]]pkσ )N−r1
=
{
[[W2 + (W1 −W2 + r1)− r1]]pkσ , if t = 1,
[[W2 + 0− 0]]pkσ , if t = 0,
=
{
[[W1]]pkσ , if t = 1,
[[W2]]pkσ , if t = 0,
[[qMin,i]]pkσ
← SAD([[q2,i]]pkA , l5,i) · ([[t]]pkσ )N−r2,i
=

[[q2,i + (q1,i − q2,i + r2,i)− r2,i]]pkσ ,
if t = 1,
[[q2,i + 0− 0]]pkσ , if t = 0,
=
{
[[q1,i]]pkσ , if t = 1,
[[q2,i]]pkσ , if t = 0,
[[yMin,i]]pkσ
← SAD([[y2,i]]pkA , l6,i) · ([[t]]pkσ )N−r3,i
=

[[y2,i + (y1,i − y2,i + r3,i)− r3,i]]pkσ ,
if t = 1,
[[y2,i + 0− 0]]pkσ , if t = 0,
=
{
[[y1,i]]pkσ , if t = 1,
[[y2,i]]pkσ , if t = 0,
Since t is unknown to CP, A∗ cannot decide the result
[[ET PMin]]pkσ comes from [[ET P1]]pkA or [[ET P2]]pkA .
(3) A∗ is assumed to compromise CSP and get CSP’s partial
strong key SK2. But A∗ cannot get CP’s partial strong
key SK1. A∗ also cannot get hospital A’s secret key
skA, patient B’s secret key skB and B’s authorization
secret key skσ .
In step 2 of the SMin protocol, A∗ obtains
(l′0, l0, l1, l2,i, l3,i) transmitted by CP. Since A∗ knows
CSP’s partial strong key SK2, A∗ decrypts l′′0 =
PD2SK2(l0, l
′
0). If L(l′′0 ) < L(N)/2, CSP sets t = 0
and computes
l4 = [[0]]pkσ , l5,i = [[0]]pkσ , l6,i = [[0]]pkσ .
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If L(l′′0 ) > L(N)/2, CSP sets t = 1 and computes
l4 = CR(l1), l5,i = CR(l2,i), l6,i = CR(l3,i).
Since A∗ can get the plaintext l′′0 , A∗ cannot deduce the
relationship of size between W1 and W2. The reason is
explained below.
In step 1, CP flips a random coins s ∈ {0, 1} and
calculates (l0, l1, l2,i, l3,i) according to s. The adversary
A∗ gets
l0 =
{
[[r′0(W
′
1 −W ′2) + r0]]pkσ , if s = 1,
[[r′0(W
′
2 −W ′1) + r0]]pkσ , if s = 0,
l1 =
{
[[W2 −W1 + r1]]pkσ , if s = 1,
[[W1 −W2 + r1]]pkσ , if s = 0,
l2,i =
{
[[q2,i − q1,i + r2,i]]pkσ , if s = 1,
[[q1,i − q2,i + r2,i]]pkσ , if s = 0,
l3,i =
{
[[y2,i − y1,i + r3,i]]pkσ , if s = 1,
[[y1,i − y2,i + r3,i]]pkσ , if s = 0,
Due to the randomness of s, A∗ cannot deduce the
relationship of size between W1 and W2.
(4) A∗ is assumed to be a set of collude malicious patients
(B1, · · · , Bn) (except the challenge patient B∗), and
A∗ gets their secret keys (skB1 , · · · , skBn). A∗ wants
to get the data that belongs to the challenge patient
B∗. Suppose the returned result is [[ET PMin]]pkΣ∗ =
([[QMin]]pkΣ∗ , [[YMin]]pkΣ∗ , [[WMin]]pkΣ∗ ), where
pkΣ∗ is the authorize public key from hospital A to
challenge patient B∗. Since the patient’s secret keys
are independently generated, the adversary A∗ cannot
utilize (skB1 , · · · , skBn) to deduce the challenge
patient B∗’s secret key skB∗ . A∗ also cannot get the
authorization secret key skΣ∗ . Thus, A∗ cannot recover
(QMin,YMin,WMin).
According to the analysis, SMin is secure against the
adversary A∗ defined in the attack model. 
D-2. Proof of BPS-k: Theorem 6-1. BPS-k is secure
to select the top-k best encrypted treatment procedures (with
lowest weights) in the presence of semi-honest (non-colluding)
attackers A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2).
Proof. We now construct the following independent simu-
lators (SimD1 , SimS1 , SimS2).
SimD1 receives ET Pi (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n) as inputs and
simulates AD1 as following, where
ET Pi = (Qi,Yi,Wi),
Qi = (q0, qi,θ1 , · · · , qi,MState−1),
Yi = (yi,θ1 , · · · , yi,MState−1),
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
It generates [[ET Pi]]pkA for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where
[[ET Pi]]pkA = ([[Qi]]pkA , [[Yi]]pkA , [[Wi]]pkσ ),
[[Qi]]pkA = ([[q0]]pkA , [[qi,θ1 ]]pkA , · · · , [[qi,MState−1]]pkA),
[[Yi]]pkA = ([[yi,θ1 ]]pkA , · · · , [[yi,MState−1]]pkA).
The entire view of AD1 is the received tuples and the
encrypted data. The IND-CPA security of PCTD ensures that
AD1 ’s view is indistinguishable from its view in the real world
execution.
SimS1 simulates AS1 as following. It randomly generates
[[ETP]]pkA = ([[ET P1]]pkA , · · · , [[ET Pn]]pkA) and inputs them
into SimSMinnS1 in Theorem 5 and gets [[ET PMini ]]pkσ =
([[QMini ]]pkσ , [[YMini ]]pkσ , [[WMini ]]pkσ ), where WMini is the
lowest weight in the i-th round. SimS1 randomly selects
r′j , rj ∈ ZN , and computes lj = ([[WMini ]]pkσ )rj ·
([[Wj ]]pkσ )
N−rj . Then, SimS1 partially decrypts lj to l
′
j =
PD1SK1(lj), and permutes (lj , l
′
j) using the permutation
function pii. The result is denoted as (lpii(j), l
′
pii(j)
). SimS1
sends (lpii(j), l
′
pii(j)
) and the intermediate encrypted data of
SimSMinnS1 to AS1 . If AS1 replies with ⊥, then SimS1 outputs⊥. The IND-CPA security of PCTD ensures that AS1 ’s view
is indistinguishable from its view in the real world execution.
SimS2 simulates AS2 as following. It randomly generates
ρ ∈ {0, 1}. If ρ = 0, it sets Apii(j) = [[MWeight]]pkσ ;
otherwise, it sets Apii(j) = [[1]]pkσ . The generated ciphertexts
Apii(j) is computationally indistinguishable from the real world
due to the IND-CPA security of PCTD. In both real and ideal
world, the views of AS2 are indistinguishable. 
Theorem 6-2. BPS-k is secure against the adversary A∗
defined in the attack model.
Proof. The adversary A∗ is assumed to have the following
abilities.
(1) A∗ is assumed to be an outside adversary and eavesdrop
all the communications to get the transmitted data. As
A∗ is assumed to be an outside adversary, A∗ cannot get
hospital A’s secret key skA, patient B’s secret key skB
and B’s authorization secret key skσ . A∗ also cannot get
CP’s partial strong key SK1 and CSP’s partial strong
key SK2. If A∗ eavesdrops the communication channel
between system user and CP, A∗ could get [[ETP]]pkA =
([[ET P1]]pkσ , · · · , [[ET Pn]]pkσ ) that is transmitted at
the beginning of BPS-k, and [[ETPMin]]pkσ =
([[ET PMin1 ]]pkσ , · · · , [[ET PMink ]]pkσ ) that is sent at
the end of BPS-k, where [[ET PMini ]]pkA =
([[QMini ]]pkA , [[YMini ]]pkA , [[WMini ]]pkσ ) for i ∈ [[1, k]].
Since the elements in [[ETP]]pkA and [[ETPMin]]pkσ are
encrypted using the PCTD algorithm, the adversary A∗
cannot recover ET Pi = (Qi,Yi,Wi) for i ∈ [[1, n]] and
the plaintext underlying [[ETPMin]]pkσ due to the IND-
CPA security of PCTD.
If A∗ eavesdrops the communication channel
between CP and CSP, A∗ could get (lpii(j), l′pii(j))
in line 6, and Apii(j) in line 8 of BPS-k,
where lj = ([[WMini ]]pkσ )
rj · ([[Wj ]]pkσ )N−rj ,
l′j = PD1SK1(lj) and Apii(j) = [[MWeight]]pkσ
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or Apii(j) = [[1]]pkσ . In BPS-k, the ciphertexts
(lpii(j), l
′
pii(j)
, Apii(j)) are all encrypted using the public
key pkσ . Since the adversary A∗ does know the patient
B’s authorization secret key skσ and the CSP’s partial
strong key SK2, A∗ cannot recover the underlying
plaintexts.
(2) A∗ is assumed to compromise CP and get CP’s partial
strong key SK1. But A∗ cannot get CSP’s partial strong
key SK2. A∗ also cannot get hospital A’s secret key
skA, patient B’s secret key skB and B’s authorization
secret key skσ .
In line 6 of BPS-k, A∗ obtains
lj = ([[WMini ]]pkσ )
rj · ([[Wj ]]pkσ )N−rj
= [[rj(WMini −Wj)]]pkσ
A∗ cannot recover rj(WMini −Wj) without the secret
key skσ . In line 8, A∗ obtains Apii(j) from CSP, where
Apii(j) =
{
[[MWeight]]pkσ , if l
′′
pii(j)
= 0,
[[1]]pkσ , otherwise.
Since l′′pii(j) and skσ are unknown to CP, A∗ cannot
decrypt Apii(j) nor distinguish [[ET PMini ]]pkσ comes
from which element in [[ETP]]pkA .
(3) A∗ is assumed to compromise CSP and get CSP’s partial
strong key SK2. But A∗ cannot get CP’s partial strong
key SK1. A∗ also cannot get hospital A’s private key
skA, patient B’s private key skB and B’s authorization
secret key skσ .
In line 6 of BPS-k, A∗ obtains (lpii(j), l′pii(j)) transmit-
ted by CP. Since A∗ knows CSP’s partial strong key
SK2, A∗ decrypts
l′′pii(j) = PD2SK2(lpii(j), l
′
pii(j)
)
= rpii(j)(WMini −Wpii(j))
Although A∗ knows whether rpii(j)(WMini − Wpii(j))
equals 0, the adversary A∗ cannot distinguish Wpii(j)
comes from which element in (W1, · · · ,Wn). The
reason is that CP utilizes a permutation function pii
to disrupt the order of (l1, · · · , ln) and (l′1, · · · , l′n)
in line 6 of BPS-k. Thus, A∗ cannot distinguish
[[ET PMini ]]pkσ comes from which element in
[[ETP]]pkA = ([[ET P1]]pkσ , · · · , [[ET Pn]]pkσ ).
(4) A∗ is assumed to be the collude malicious patients
(B1, · · · , Bn) (except the challenge patient B∗), and A∗
gets their secret keys (skB1 , · · · , skBn). A∗ wants to
get the information that belongs to the challenge patient
B∗. Suppose the returned result is [[ETPMin]]pkΣ∗ =
([[ET PMin1 ]]pkΣ∗ , · · · , [[ET PMink ]]pkΣ∗ ) that is sent
at the end of the protocol, where [[ET PMini ]]pkΣ∗ =
([[QMini ]]pkΣ∗ , [[YMini ]]pkΣ∗ , [[WMini ]]pkΣ∗ )
(i ∈ [[1, k]]), and pkΣ∗ is the authorize public key
from hospital A to challenge patient B∗. Since the
patient’s secret keys are independently generated,
the adversary A∗ cannot utilize (skB1 , · · · , skBn) to
deduce the challenge patient B∗’s secret key skB∗ .
A∗ also cannot get skΣ∗ . Thus, A∗ cannot recover
(QMini ,YMini ,WMini) for i ∈ [[1, k]].
According to the above analysis, BPS-k is secure against
the adversary A∗ defined in the attack model. 
E. Detailed Experiment Data
This section presents the detailed experiment data of the
performance analysis shown in Section IX. Table VI shows
the experiment data of Fig. 12(a)-12(b). Table VII presents
the detailed data of Fig. 12(c)-12(d). Table VIII shows the
experiment data of Fig. 12(e)-12(h). Table IX gives out the
detailed data of Fig. 12(i)-12(j). Table X gives out the detailed
data of Fig. 12(k)-12(l).
14
TABLE VI: Performance of SSM, TPW and SMin (MState = 10, m = 3, n = 1)
Computation Cost (s) Communication Cost (MB)
L(N) 512 768 1024 1280 1536 1792 2048 512 768 1024 1280 1536 1792 2048
SSM 0.361 1.079 2.343 4.162 6.658 12.005 18.012 0.052 0.078 0.104 0.130 0.156 0.182 0.208
TPW 6.423 20.155 42.427 81.127 127.588 220.552 291.764 1.248 1.876 2.503 3.130 3.757 4.382 5.010
SMin 0.777 2.194 4.418 10.154 16.211 25.062 38.442 0.181 0.272 0.363 0.455 0.546 0.636 0.728
TABLE VII: Performance of TPW (L(N) = 1024)
AVG(TP) m Computation Communication
(min) (MB)
10
1 0.653 1.356
2 0.674 2.033
3 0.690 2.503
4 0.712 2.765
5 0.719 2.823
20
1 1.859 3.050
2 1.934 4.749
3 1.975 6.243
4 1.997 7.529
5 2.052 8.598
30
1 3.296 4.946
2 3.368 7.670
3 3.411 10.189
4 3.438 12.495
5 3.478 14.592
40
1 4.735 17.66
2 4.926 10.786
3 5.164 14.333
4 5.331 17.66
5 5.436 20.789
50
1 6.670 9.357
2 6.903 14.118
3 7.031 18.669
4 7.263 23.041
5 7.461 27.201
TABLE VIII: Performance of SMinn and BPSk (k = 1)
Parameter Computation Communication
(min) (MB)
n MState SMinn BPSk SMinn BPSk
20
10 0.957 1.018 6.910 7.042
20 1.765 1.829 13.704 13.838
30 2.521 2.965 20.506 20.654
40 3.520 3.695 27.312 27.443
50 4.331 4.587 34.123 34.250
40
10 1.719 1.805 14.196 14.443
20 3.199 3.512 28.140 28.396
30 5.078 5.388 41.112 42.396
40 5.976 6.237 56.036 56.284
50 8.644 9.028 70.046 70.274
60
10 2.077 2.498 21.457 21.871
20 4.096 4.773 42.595 42.979
30 6.909 7.279 63.633 64.091
40 9.667 10.112 84.810 85.270
50 11.741 12.244 105.864 106.342
80
10 2.907 3.383 28.753 29.279
20 6.730 7.039 57.030 57.508
30 9.342 9.670 85.213 85.864
40 11.905 12.896 113.574 114.056
50 15.025 16.634 141.774 142.311
100
10 3.821 4.025 35.991 36.666
20 7.981 8.271 71.471 72.115
30 10.527 11.605 106.810 107.449
40 15.261 16.386 142.310 142.955
50 19.018 21.531 177.625 178.266
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TABLE IX: Performance of P-Med (L(N) = 1024, k = 1)
n AVG(TP) m Computation Communication n AVG(TP) m Computation Communication
(min) (MB) (min) (MB)
40
10
1 2.778 68.683
60
10
1 3.711 103.231
2 2.799 95.763 2 3.732 143.851
3 2.815 114.563 3 3.748 172.051
4 2.837 125.043 4 3.770 187.771
5 2.844 127.363 5 3.777 119.251
20
1 6.231 150.396
20
1 7.596 225.979
2 6.306 218.356 2 7.671 327.919
3 6.347 278.116 3 7.712 417.559
4 6.369 329.556 4 7.734 494.719
5 6.424 372.316 5 7.789 558.859
30
1 9.995 240.236
30
1 11.809 360.851
2 10.067 349.196 2 11.881 524.291
3 10.11 449.956 3 11.924 675.431
4 10.137 542.196 4 11.951 813.791
5 10.177 626.076 5 11.991 939.611
40
1 12.985 338.244
40
1 17.081 508.210
2 13.176 487.724 2 17.272 732.43
3 13.414 629.604 3 17.51 945.25
4 13.581 762.684 4 17.677 1144.87
5 13.686 887.844 5 17.782 1332.61
50
1 18.78 444.554
50
1 22.37 667.762
2 19.013 634.994 2 22.603 953.422
3 19.141 817.034 3 22.731 1226.482
4 19.373 991.914 4 22.963 1488.802
5 19.571 1158.314 5 23.161 1738.402
80
10
1 5.049 137.759
100
10
1 5.71 172.266
2 5.07 191.919 2 5.731 239.966
3 5.086 229.519 3 5.747 286.966
4 5.108 250.479 4 5.769 313.166
5 5.115 255.119 5 5.776 318.966
20
1 10.552 301.508
20
1 12.452 377.115
2 10.627 437.428 2 12.527 547.015
3 10.668 556.948 3 12.568 696.415
4 10.690 659.828 4 12.593 825.015
5 10.745 745.348 5 12.645 931.915
30
1 15.624 481.544
30
1 17.912 602.049
2 15.696 699.464 2 17.984 874.449
3 15.739 900.984 3 18.027 1126.349
4 15.766 1085.464 4 18.054 1356.949
5 15.806 1253.224 5 18.094 1566.649
40
1 20.982 677.976
40
1 25.357 847.855
2 21.173 976.936 2 25.548 1221.555
3 21.411 1260.696 3 25.786 1576.255
4 21.578 1526.856 4 25.953 1908.955
5 21.683 1777.176 5 26.058 2221.855
50
1 27.986 890.871
50
1 32.898 1113.966
2 28.219 1271.751 2 33.131 1590.066
3 28.347 1635.831 3 33.259 2045.166
4 28.579 1985.591 4 33.491 2482.366
5 28.777 2318.391 5 33.689 2898.366
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TABLE X: Performance of P-Gene (L(N) = 1024)
m µ n
Computation Communication
(min) (MB)
10 2
m− µ = 8 1.097 4.294
m = 10 1.371 5.368
m+ µ = 12 1.645 6.442
20 4
m− µ = 16 3.544 30.269
m = 20 4.430 37.837
m+ µ = 24 5.316 45.404
30 6
m− µ = 24 9.696 97.559
m = 30 12.121 121.948
m+ µ = 36 14.545 146.338
40 8
m− µ = 32 19.484 225.797
m = 40 24.355 282.246
m+ µ = 48 29.226 338.697
50 10
m− µ = 40 35.197 434.619
m = 50 43.996 543.274
m+ µ = 60 52.795 651.929
